Civilizing (the) Chiefs : Islam and Indirect Rule in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast by Kaye, Tony
	  	  	  	  
 
CIVILIZING (THE) CHIEFS: ISLAM AND INDIRECT RULE IN THE NORTHERN 











 A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of History 
in the Department of History 























© Copyright Tony Karlson Kaye, August 2011. All rights reserved. 
 	  
	   i	  
PERMISION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis/dissertation in 
any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or 
professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the 
Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that 
any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain 
shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition 
shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be 





The research was exclusively created to meet the thesis requirements for the degree of Master of 
Arts at the University of Saskatchewan.  Reference in this thesis to any specific commercial 
products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the University of 
Saskatchewan. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not state or reflect 
those of the University of Saskatchewan, and shall not be used for advertising or product 
endorsement purposes. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
 
 Head of the Department of History 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A2 
 Canada 
	   ii	  
ABSTRACT 
British colonizers relied on chieftaincies as civilizing partners to implement 
indirect rule in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. A major explanation for the 
British preference for chieftaincies surrounds how colonizers interpreted recent decades 
of Muslim intermarriage in the savannah. The arrival of Muslim chiefs to the savannah 
produced a handful of chiefly led communities. These relatively few groups had loose 
cultural similarities with European society. The British interpreted the commonalities as 
signs of human progress in the savannah. Conversely, the British rejected the African 
communities without Islamic traditions because they did not have recognizable or 
centralized forms of political leadership. Furthermore, depicting non-chiefly groups as 
wildly different from European society reinforced the modern and progressive identity of 
Britain while simultaneously representing non-chiefly groups of the protectorate as 
socially static or infantile. Believing in the superiority of Muslim-based chieftaincies and 
the inferiority of non-chiefly groups reflected the Orientalist literary depiction the British 
began in travel and diplomatic correspondence from and about the savannah. This early 
intelligence gathering from the nineteenth century produced vivid judgments about the 
relative value of chiefly and non-chiefly communities for colonizers. The British saw the 
existence of Muslim-derived chieftaincies as proof that Africans required outside 
intervention to experience change. Consequently, the view justified British imposition 
and the civilizing mission. This thesis examines a variety of interlocking British 
documents—travel and diplomatic literature, colonial administrative reporting, and early 
anthropological studies—to highlight the positive British discourse representing chiefly 
groups of the Northern Territories.
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1. Introduction 
The British relied on chieftaincies as civilizing partners to implement indirect rule 
in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. A major explanation for the British 
preference for chieftaincies surrounds how colonizers interpreted recent decades of 
Muslim intermarriage in the savannah. The arrival of Muslim chiefs to the savannah 
produced a handful of chiefly led communities. These relatively few groups had loose 
cultural similarities with European society. The British interpreted the commonalities as 
signs of human progress in the savannah. For example, the colonizers thought 
chieftaincies were politically centralized communities. They were united by the 
paramount authority of a chief who ruled as first among equals with kinship heads and 
other headmen. They were literate, produced textiles, appeared monotheistic, seemed to 
be individual landowners, controlled regional trade networks, and possessed civil 
servants and highly organized military structures. Conversely, the British rejected the 
African communities without Islamic traditions because they did not have recognizable 
or centralized forms of political leadership. Furthermore, depicting non-chiefly groups as 
wildly different from European society reinforced the modern and progressive identity of 
Britain while simultaneously representing non-chiefly groups of the protectorate as 
socially static or infantile. 
Believing in the superiority of Muslim-based chieftaincies and the inferiority of 
non-chiefly groups reflected the Orientalist literary depiction the British began in travel 
and diplomatic correspondence from and about the savannah. These early intelligence 
reports from the nineteenth century produced vivid judgments about the relative value of 
chiefly and non-chiefly communities for colonizers as they occupied and later organized 
the territory into a civil bureaucracy in 1905. The British saw the existence of Muslim-
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derived chieftaincies as proof that Africans required outside intervention to experience 
change. Consequently, the view justified British imposition and the civilizing mission. 
Instead of relying on economic interpretations for colonial rule in West Africa, I 
argue that British decision-makers ultimately pursued a civilizing mission that aimed at 
extending modernity overseas. The policy of indirect rule intended to carry out the British 
civilizing mission through close relationships between colonial officers and African 
chiefs. The British utilized African authorities to establish institutions and begin 
development projects intending to produce individual instead of collectivistic self-
reflections among African subjects. Africans enlisted in the armed forces; they bought 
and sold in cash-based markets; they worked as laborers on infrastructure and agricultural 
sites; they enrolled in primary school; and, by extension, they worked as clerks and 
assistants in the network of Native Administrations the British created. In engineering 
these modernizing or civilizing activities, the British built new social arrangements for 
their African subjects to self-regulate the colonial regime’s desire for modernity. 
This thesis surveys the influence of British textual knowledge on colonial policy 
in the Northern Territories in five chapters. As such, the research focuses on British 
writing about Africans and colonial policy but not necessarily on the experiences of 
Africans during colonial rule. The present chapter introduces how the representation of 
chieftaincies reflected the greater civilizing strategy active in British West Africa. By 
ranking chiefly and non-chiefly groups according to a European standard of human 
advancement, the British imagined chiefly groups, which displayed distinguishing 
Islamic histories and centralized governments, as superior to the non-chiefly groups of 
the savannah. 
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The second chapter couches British optimism with chieftaincy in a longstanding 
assumption or myth of the interior produced in a series of influential travel and 
diplomatic publications. The early writing on the West African savannah, an area 
previously unseen by the British, offered vivid imaginaries of a Muslim dominated north 
that seemed to identify chieftaincies like the Dagomba and Gonja as powerful Islamic 
kingdoms. Chapter three analyzes the first decades of Annual Reports from the Northern 
Territories to illustrate why the British shifted from a military occupation to a civil 
administration of their newest protectorate. These years offer the clearest picture of the 
contradictory aims of the civilizing mission in the savannah. These included how indirect 
rule, a system that utilized native authorities for colonial control, began a process with the 
main goal of eradicating African custom and tradition. Despite this paradox, the 
administration rehearsed its confidence in chieftaincy as a marker of progress and 
continued to support and fabricate chiefly rulers throughout the protectorate. The fourth 
chapter highlights the rise of anthropological scholarship and how the British used 
anthropological studies to attempt to confront the problem a generation of government-
made chiefs introduced to the administration. The British remained optimistic about 
chieftaincy into the 1930s but began to recognize that the lack of authentic chiefly 
representatives in the savannah, which meant the transport of savannah youth to the 
south, better fulfilled the aims of the civilizing mission. 
The Historical Record 
This thesis examines a variety of interlocking British documents—travel and 
diplomatic literature, colonial administrative reporting, and early anthropological 
studies— to highlight the positive British discourse representing chiefly groups of the 
Northern Territories. The British admiration for chieftaincy began as an interpretation 
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about the positive influence of Muslim intermarriage on the political and spiritual life of 
the savannah. Examining the British intelligence about the savannah before the Northern 
Territories became annexed to the Gold Coast in 1902 showed that the Colonial Office 
targeted powerful Muslim kingdoms or empires to establish treaty agreements as a means 
to expand their power against European rivals. 
For instance, the travel accounts by Gold Coast emissaries Thomas Bowdich 
(Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, 1817), Joseph Dupuis (Journal of A 
Residence in Ashantee, 1824), and Henry Barth (Travels and Discoveries in North and 
Central Africa, Vol. III, 1858) were key in naming the Dagomba and Gonja as 
supposedly powerful Emirates with connections to the trading network centered at 
Timbuktu. 
Operating in the savannah under this assumption several decades later, another 
Gold Coast agent, George Ekem Ferguson, quickly indicated that instead of Emirates, the 
previous intermarriage of itinerant Muslim traders in previous centuries established only 
a few chiefly kingdoms but no Emirates similar to those in neighboring Nigeria. More 
importantly, Ferguson’s writing established the precedent of viewing chiefly group as 
culturally distinct from, and as a result, superior to the typically non-chiefly communities 
that dotted the savannah. The writings of Ferguson were particularly instructive about the 
British ability to reconfigure the self-reflections of an African colonial subject. His 
correspondence might be one possible proof about the effectiveness of the civilizing 
mission. Ferguson’s writing clearly shows his profound internalization of the British 
progressive or stratified view of humanity by continually referring to the progress of 
Britain northward as the progress of “our” civilization among the “barbarians”. 
The administrative reporting from a range of chief and district commissioners 
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stationed in the Northern Territories between 1902 and 1927 demonstrated the deepening 
British confidence in chiefs as African partners in the civilizing mission. British 
commissioners became armchair ethnographers as the Colonial Office sought out the 
paramount authorities over a diverse tribal landscape. The annual reporting contained 
applause for compliant, seemingly Muslim, and literate in Arabic chiefly societies while 
offering distain for resisting, superstitious, and illiterate non-chiefly groups. Similarly, 
specialized essays and monographs by Commissioners Cardinal (The Natives of the 
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1920), Eyre-Smith (A Brief Review of the History 
and Social Organization of the Peoples of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 
1933), and Lugard (The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 1922) all revered 
chieftaincies because their Muslim ancestry produced centralized politics, balance 
between secular and spiritual institutions, and monotheism. The few ethnographic 
surveys in the 1920s from the protectorate and the yearly administrative summaries noted 
how the progress of infrastructure, law and order, and education went faster in chiefly led 
communities while the non-chiefly groups in the NE Province continually evaded British 
control. The reports also rehearsed the relative superiority and inferiority of chiefly and 
non-chiefly groups of the savannah. These official writings powerfully created African 
identities for future readers and emergent specialists in West Africa studies, such as in 
anthropology 
The emergent anthropological studies from the early twentieth century 
perpetuated the British view that chiefly groups were further along the European path of 
civilization. While plainly writing to the politicos in the Colonial Office in London, the 
voluminous research by Ronald Rattray publically aired the mistakes of financially 
supporting, politically fabricating, and, consequently, thoroughly corrupting, chiefly 
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rulers in the savannah. Nevertheless, like the earlier colonial ethnographies about the 
north written by senior field officers, Rattray worked to improve and continue, but never 
to academically censure or halt the socially disruptive British policy of indirect rule into 
further, albeit problematized, generations of implementation. Moreover, his studies points 
out the futility of trying to modernize Africa by bolstering (and mostly fabricating) 
traditional or unmodern chiefly institutions. Ferguson raised questions about how the 
Colonial Office might measure success in this strategy, or, what place chieftaincy 
traditions might have in the desired national arrangement to come. 
The Partition of Africa, c. 1900 
The British confidence in the civilizing process is a useful model for 
contextualizing the Northern Territories within the early twentieth century division of 
Africa by European powers. The savannah protectorate represented the apex of British 
power in the region following their finger-hold of control on the Gold Coast in previous 
centuries. During the period of partition that followed, Europeans expanded their reach 
from their coastal fortresses into the interior of the continent and divided large portions of 
land under their control.1 While scholars have done much to illustrate how the British 
increased their economic gains “…by trade and influence if they could; but by imperial 
rule if they must,” disagreement lingers about the overall British objectives for colonial 
rule.2 Some historians situate British imperialism in Africa within the complex of the 
European trend towards exploitative capitalism and the construction of world systems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1976), 203; Andrew 
Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa, (Northwestern: University Press, 1959), 10. 
2 Ronald E. Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of 
Imperialism, (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1961), 10. 
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theory.3 They argue that during the nineteenth century, many influential Britons believed 
their success in the European economic rivalry hinged on developing their colonies to 
European standards of civilization.4 Yet, even economic historians of the British Empire 
recognize a dilemma in explaining British expansion in West Africa simply along 
financial lines.5 
Alone, national economic gains in the intra-European competition for foreign 
resources are superficial or partial explanations for British rule in the savannah.6 As 
Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny expressed throughout their book, Africa and the 
Victorians, British writers in the late-Victorian age placed an array of global cultures 
upon differing stages of human development according to a standard set by Anglo-
European history. The authors argued that the Victorians hoped to push non-Europeans 
“up the steps of progress which they themselves had climbed.”7 British colonialism was 
more than the out-maneuvering of other powers for control over material and raw capital 
in the fringes of empire. To offer a deeper or more complete explanation for colonial rule, 
this thesis underscores how the British partition of West Africa fit into the mental 
imaging of a modern national identity in Europe. 
The process of “imagining” a modern self-image hinged on the written 
comparisons of a corps of “intelligentsias” that directly or indirectly served the British 
Colonial Office overseas.8 In the example of British colonialism in West Africa, a range 
of elites, from British explorer-diplomats to administrator-ethnographers, used the unique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (New York: 
Longman Pub., 1993), 17-19; See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1974). 
4 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalisation and the Postcolonial World, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), 20. 
5 Cain and Hopkins, 382. 
6 Juhani Koponen, “The Partition of Africa,” Nordic Journal of African Studies Vol. 2 (1983): 126. 
7 Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, 3. 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2003), 140. 
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history of their country as an inverted mirror to reflect or represent native life in colonies 
as inferior. Imagining the superiority of chieftaincy as a form of centralized government 
in part reflected the desirable image of England’s own path towards political 
centralization under the British royals.9 In other words, this thesis examines what David 
Scott explained as the “political rationalities of colonial power.”10 The research explores 
why chieftaincies became what Scott termed the “targets of colonial power,” and 
subsequently how the British constructed chieftaincy as the particular “field” or container 
for colonial authority.11 
A History of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast Colony 
Beginning in the seventeenth century, an initial phase of mercantilist activity on 
European controlled positions prepared the way for the civilizing process to unfold into 
the savannah. The ongoing British presence on coastal West Africa depended on close 
relationships with African chiefs. Adventurers from private companies had developed 
business relationships with middlemen coastal chiefs since the seventeenth century. The 
first English commercial compacts to the Gold Coast landed in 1618, and the Crown 
government later assumed full economic and political responsibility over all British 
trading forts and castles in 1821.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny (1961) submit that historians have ignored examining how the 
imperialist mind, or “official thinking,” developed during England’s long imperialist impulse in the 
Americas, Asia, India, and Africa: “England’s rulers shared an esoteric view of desirable and undesirable 
trends stretching from the past and present to the future.” 21. 
10 David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” 23-49 in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, 
Governmentality, and Life Politics, ed., Jonathan Xavier Inda (Maden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005), 25. 
11 David Scott, 26. 
12 English government initially administered its outposts from distant Sierra Leone before Cape Coast 
Castle, a former Swedish fortress, served that role from the shores of the Gold Coast in 1844. Previous to 
crown control, the African Company of Merchants represented English commercial interests. See Albert 
van Dantzig, Forts and Castles of Ghana, (Hong Kong: Commonwealth Printing, Ltd., 1980), 21, 35, 40, 
58-70, 90; F. M. Bourret, The Gold Coast: A Survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland, 1919-1946, 
(Stanford: University Press, 1949), 23. 
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A mixture of local political strife and competition with nearby European 
companies gradually pulled the British into military conflict further inland.13 Throughout 
the nineteenth century, the British supported coastal chiefs who defied the Ashanti 
monopoly over inland trade routes to the Europeans.14 The Ashanti chiefs were the royal 
class of the Asante Confederacy, the leading African regional power that stretched along 
the western interior of the Volta river basin in the area roughly equal to the size of 
present-day Ghana.15 
After a series of bloody confrontations, British expeditionary forces sacked the 
Ashanti capital of Kumasi, which dismantled the Asante Confederacy and 
disenfranchised dozens of chieftaincies of the union. In a bid to consolidate the scattered 
chieftaincies under the English crown, the British established treaties of protection with 
many of the chiefs, and instituted the Gold Coast Colony in 1874. Since 1807, Britain 
failed to negotiate peace over decades of grievances and military action by the Ashanti 
king concerning his direct control over trade access to the European coastal outposts, 
bypassing Fante middlemen. From the European perspective, the long dispute threatened 
local trade and peace, a drama that caused six Anglo-Ashanti Wars and the British, 
desiring only the status quo, to reluctantly invade and destroy the Ashanti Metropolitan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Juhani Koponen, “The Partition of Africa,” 117; Adu Boahen, et al, Topics in West African History, New 
Edition, (England: Longman Group, 1986), 205. 
14 The feelings of disconnection among distant states in the Asante Confederacy increased their 
competitiveness over trade routes and their desire for independence from the ruling Ashanti chiefs. Chiefs 
from Akuampem, Accra, and the fledgling Fante Confederation eventually refused tribute to Kumasi and 
seized control over trade through Assin and Akyem in 1807. See J. K Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours: 
1700-1807, (Northwestern: University Press, 1971), 124, 143, 153; Adu Boahen, et al, Topics in West 
African History, New Edition, 56, 59; Boahen, “Politics in Ghana, 1800-1874, 167-261, 168. 
15 See map, “Asante Empire about 1824,” Appendix 1: Throughout this thesis, Asante refers to the political 
federation for which the Ashanti, an Akan speaking ethnic group, produced the leadership that were 
Paramount Chiefs in Kumasi. Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: University Press, 
1975), 211; K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (Oxford 
University Press, 1951); Ivor Wilks, “Ashanti Government,” in West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth 
Century, Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds., (Oxford University Press, 1969); Thomas J. Lewin, Asante 
before the British: The Prempean Years, 1875-1900 (Lawrence, KA: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978). 
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Region of Kumasi in 1874. Britain previously purchased or seized all the neighboring 
fortifications built by the Portuguese, Dutch, French, German, Swedish, and the Danish 
by 1850.16 
A new Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, led England into an ambitious 
imperial campaign in West Africa during the late 1890s.17 The ensuing era of colonial 
rule and accompanying partition relied on developing institutions and administrations to 
“organize African society for production and progress” to reflect the new modern age.18 
To bring change to the colonies, Chamberlain placed high currency on building 
infrastructure as a way to spur on a capitalist agricultural economy. Control over Africans 
was key to this and Chamberlain prefered a centralized colonial regime to either 
manipulate or remove the tribes.19 
The British deepened their commitment to West Africa by seeking new territory 
north of Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony. Within the space of a few years, the Crown 
exiled the Asantehene and sent Gold Coast emissary George Ekem Ferguson north into 
the grasslands in 1896.20 Ashanti, while still symbolically head of the shattered Asante 
Confederacy, remained a potent adversary to English forces. With the Asantehene’s 
deportation, the British sent a powerful signal about their control and supremacy in the 
region. Building on this superior position, Ferguson signed treaty agreements with a few 
northern chiefs that provided legal justification against French and German powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), 243; Adu 
Boahen, et al, Topics in West African History, New Edition, 61, 205; Robinson, Gallagher, Denny, 10; Sir 
Francis Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti, second ed., (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.: 1968), 51-67, 
70; Bourret, 19; W. Walton Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, Volume Two, (London: 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1964), 3, 352. 
17 Claridge, 238, 402-414. 
18 Italics mine. Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, 401. 
19 Ibid.., 400. 
20 William Tordoff, Ashanti Under the Prempehs: 1888-1935, (London: University Press, 1965), 59-60. 
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competing for the same territory.21 The Colonial Office sent Ferguson with the only 
reconnaissance of the savannah available at the time: seventy-year-old reports that 
alluded to northern Muslim kings as the dominant force of the savannah. By the turn of 
the twentieth century, from their initial position on the coastline the British gained 
military control over hundreds of miles of forest and arable grasslands.22 
Modernity and the Control of Chiefs 
Colonizers in West Africa envisioned their success in the civilizing mission 
hinging on advancing at least the veneer of personal freedom for, primarily male, 
Africans. Individual freedom was necessary in the modern ideal for humans to master 
themselves and the rest of the natural world. Underscoring this particular view, this thesis 
responds to what Robert Young expressed in 2001 was the contemporary lack of 
understanding about the motivations behind the so-called White man’s burden of 
colonialism. In his significant research about colonialism and anti-colonialism, Young 
suggested that, as a legacy of the Enlightenment, British colonialism was the application 
of the nineteenth century belief that humans were inevitably led to greater freedom and 
equality.23 Culminating in the anthropological studies of the 1930s, a discernible social 
Darwinist thinking supported nationalist urges towards colonial rule. With the creation of 
sea charts and printing presses in Europe, imperialist intellectuals became certain that 
humans divided into so-called advanced and primitive races, with northern Europeans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 These treaties, unlike the treaties of ‘protection’ Britain sought with the disenfranchised chiefs, were 
treaties of ‘friendship and trade’. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast 
Nationalism, 1850-1929, (Oxford: University Press, 1963), 290. 
22 See map,  “Sketch Map of the Gold Coast, Ashanti, and Northern Territories,” Appendix 2. 
23 Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, 
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holding first rank.24 With this conviction, colonizing powers felt inexorably responsible 
for creating a new, Enlightenment sense of individual freedom and self-reflection upon 
encountering foreign societies supposedly slave to base human urges. There existed a 
measure of uniformity in the British approach to their well-intended aims in the colonies. 
For instance, Michael Crowder compared British aims in West Africa and India, where 
furthering individual freedom allowed for forms of intimate self-regulation instead of 
traditional group belonging and ritual.25 Yet, as this thesis outlines, the British civilizing 
mission in the Northern Territories depended on establishing diverse forms of control. 
Imparting a sense of individuality was essential to modern governance techniques 
in colonial West Africa. For instance, Michel Foucault underscored how governors 
institutionalized modern forms of control by focusing on the individual. To Foucault, the 
aim of modern governance, or “Governmentality,” was to create self-regulating persons 
that internalize the wider social context.26 Applying this thinking to governance in the 
Northern Territories, for example, British administrators hoped to “imbricate” or 
interconnect individual Africans into new common experiences designed to create a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 L. H. Gann and Peter Duigan, The Rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914, (Stanford: University Press, 
1978), 262-263, 341-342. 
25 The ability of the British to control and change, for instance, how the colonized viewed and cared for 
their bodies was a component of the civilizing process. While processes of colonialism closely associate 
with political and religious actions designed to create autonomous and civilized colonial subjects, the 
British attempt to establish a modern medical practice and alter self-perceptions of masculinity and health 
in India fit into the aim to control and ultimately change the self-perception of Indians into a modern self-
governing ideal. See Crowder, 211; James Mills, “’More Important to Civilize than Subdue’?” in 
Colonialism as Civilizing Mission, Harald-Fischer Tine and Michael Mann, eds., (London: Wimbeldon 
Publishing, 2004), 179-190; Paul Dimeo, Sporting and the ‘Civilizing Mission.’?” in Colonialism as 
Civilizing Mission, Harald-Fischer Tine and Michael Mann, eds., (London: Wimbeldon Publishing, 2004), 
165-178; David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State, Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-
Century India, (California: University Press, 1993); Biswamoy Pati, “‘Ordering’ ‘Disorder’ in a Holy City” 
in Health, Medicine, and Empire, Biswamoy Pati and Mark Harrison, eds., (Hydrabad: Orient Longman, 
2001), 270-297; Mark Harrison, “Medicine and Orientalism” in Health, Medicine, and Empire, Biswamoy 
Pati and Mark Harrison, eds., (Hydrabad: Orient Longman, 2001), 37-87. 
26 Foucault argued that the role of modern governance was to employ “techniques” of government designed 
to infiltrate the minute self-reflections and interests of the population. See Michel Foucault, 
“Governmentality,” in The Essential Foucault, eds., Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, (New York: The 
New Press, 2003), 233. 
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modern self-image.27 Thus, colonizers believed creating schools, industries, and colonial 
armed forces would help the British to control and discipline Africans into monitoring 
themselves and each other in a way that would reflect a new European-ness. Thus, by 
1926, in an interesting insight, Governor Guggisberg remarked that British rule in the 
Gold Coast was changing stereotypically “collectivistic” Africans into modern 
“individualists.”28 Embedded in this trend towards creating a new modern individual, the 
African subjects of colonial rule would internalize the values, attitudes, and strategies 
determined by colonial rulers to maximize the common wealth and protection of the 
population.29 Here, the central contradiction in British strategy emerged when the 
civilizing mission in the savannah meant forcing individuals to give up their traditions in 
place of a modern way of life. Yet, local British tactics that supported the principles of 
indirect rule conversely enshrined and even fabricated traditional rulers to establish 
colonial authority. 
Regional security and personal compliance to British law were the fundamental 
requirements for colonial law and order. As such, colonial rulers recognized in chiefly 
zones ready-made environments for civilization when individual chiefs appeared eager to 
enforce British initiatives. In this way, Mahmood Mamdani contended that the British 
envisioned the authority structure of the “colonial state as less a territorial construct than 
a cultural one”.30 The architecture of power relied upon the British perception of native 
authorities as a local design for British officers to draft European state structures of 
control. “The boundaries of culture,” illuminated Mamdani, “would mark the parameters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Foucault, 235. 
28 The Effect on African Races of Contact with European Civilization, Governor F. G. Guggisberg, Gold 
Coast Colony, Accra, to Chief Commissioner, N.T., 8 October, 1926, 3a, NRG8/2/7, PRAAD/NR. 
29 Foucault, 241, 243. 
30 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton: University Press, 1996), 33, 76. 
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of territorial administration” in the protectorate.31 At a district level of administration, 
Mamdani pointed out that the British placed African ethnic groups “under the custody of 
a Native Authority said to be the rightful bearer and enforcer of an age-old custom and 
tradition” of political power.32 Furthermore, to enter the minds of individual Africans, 
British policy-makers sought to preserve traditional authorities presumably as vessels for 
“eventual self-government.”33 The colonizers organized the chiefs they controlled into an 
array of Native Authorities with local legal powers over the various districts of the 
savannah. African chiefs became gatekeepers into the lives of individual villagers who 
the British hoped would become the farmers, students, wage earners, and law abiders in a 
new modern order. 
British officials particularly relied upon individual chiefly rulers to help secure the 
loyalty of the colony on a village or family level. Thus, indirect rule created a body of 
governor-officials who “ruled by reports” about their varying successes and failures with 
chiefs and headmen in the Native Authority.34 The governor-administrators wrote about 
native progress regarding capitalist food production, wearing cotton clothing, local 
enrolment in primary education, wage earning on distant infrastructure projects, and 
service in the colonial military corps. As Foucault illustrated, working to create these 
personal behaviors and local institutions, governor-administrators hoped to control the 
lives of their African subjects by redesigning the varying contexts by which individuals 
envisioned their personal conduct and the behavior of their communities. In practice, the 
British deployed new agricultural economies, textile use, and wage earning first and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mamdani, 79. 
32 Ibid, 49. 
33 Margret Wrong, “The Evolution of Local Government In British African Colonies,” International Affairs 
Vol., 22 No., 3 (1946): 418; Cohen, 30; Crowder, 171, 213. 
34 Nii-K Plange, “The Colonial State in Northern Ghana,” Review of African Political Economy No., 31 
Capital vs. Labour in West Africa (Dec., 1984), 31, 35. 
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easiest in chiefly zones, especially after these districts seemed to cooperate quickly and 
offered little resistance once the British arrived to the area. As becomes clear in the 
analytical chapters that follow, underpinning the move to develop the savannah was the 
well-rehearsed practice in Britain of maintaining the superiority of chieftaincy in a 
written form. 
Orientalism 
The superiority of chieftaincy in the minds of the Northern Territories 
administration was a feature of the long-standing British Orientalist preoccupation with 
the West African Sudan. At its simplest, Orientalism used knowledge as power to 
construct the modern European self-image. Appreciating this influential relationship 
helps understand two ways the positive image of chieftaincy confirmed the primacy of 
the modern European identity. One explanation for this identity formation championed 
Muslim chieftaincies as an innovation loosely compared to European-styled progress. 
The second process of European identity formation occurred along more classic 
Orientalist lines that contrasted culturally static Africans with evolving Europeans. The 
British came to recognize that chieftaincy arrived from a Muslim and presumably non-
African source. As such, the Islamic influence demonstrated that Africans, unlike 
Europeans, were incapable of independent change, a key component in the Orientalist 
construction of non-European inferiority. Furthermore, by highlighting this seeming 
inability, the British could continually frame so-called pure Africans as primitive 
representatives of traditional and non-modern society. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Orientalist literature was well established as 
representing the colonial world as inferior to European civilization. Edward Said 
contended that Orientalism at its center is a process whereby authors create the modern 
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self-image as the opposite of traditional societies in Europe’s past and throughout Africa, 
Asia, and India.35 As Ania Loomba elaborated, Orientalism is a body of knowledge that 
defines the European image as the inversion of the societies Europeans encountered 
during their age of exploration and imperial conquest: 
Said shows that this opposition is crucial to European self-conception: if 
colonized people are irrational, Europeans are rational; if the former are 
barbaric, sensual, lazy, Europe is civilization itself, with its sexual appetites 
under control and its dominant ethic of hard work; if the [colonized are] 
static, Europe can be seen as developing and marching ahead.36 
 
Hence, Said underscored that European writing created the idea of Europeans as the 
modern masters of their own destiny by describing non-European societies as infantile 
and in need of cultural patronage through military occupation and civil administration. A 
fundamental requirement of the binary process of identity formation is the manifold 
“configurations of power” that grant the author a position of dominance over her or his 
subject.37 From their privileged vantage point, Orientalist authors used a “culturally 
hegemonic” form of authority and self-reference in their writing about the non-European 
Other.38 For example, British administrators in the African savannah benefited from their 
position of military and, what they saw as, cultural power and positioned Africans along a 
continuum of human progress relative to the colonizers. 
The power of Orientalism rested on the “sheer, overpowering, [and] monumental 
description” of texts illuminating to the British previously mysterious and unknown 
spaces and people.39 This knowledge was crucial for the British in lengthening their 
political reach over the lives of actual Africans that they envisioned in an imaginary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books ed., (New York: Random House, 1979), 7. 
36 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, (London: Routledge, 1998), 47. 
37 Said, 5. 
38 Said, 7, 12; Loomba, 73. 
39 Said, 162. 
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“world on paper.”40 The textual image was always available to feed or reinforce the 
British imagination of the colony. 
The textual representation of the African interior began with travel literature that 
focused on assumptions about the West African Other.41 By 1932, a group of British 
emissaries, commissioners, surveyors, and anthropologists had disseminated a diverse 
and detailed collection of writing about the ethnography and history regarding the 
peoples of the Ashanti hinterland. In the era of social sciences, the Orientalist imaginary 
of the savannah gained a “scientific and rational basis” that produced a new language for 
future writers to reference.42 For instance, the utter centrality of political organization to 
British officers during the early colonial era directly influenced the historical and 
especially anthropological discussions leading to post-independence in northern Ghana. 
The founding academic anthropological studies about the Northern Territories by Ronald 
Rattray, Meyer Fortes, and Madeline Manoukian divided the many ethnic groups of the 
savannah according to their chiefly status.43 The resulting objective social scientific terms 
“acephalous” and “cephalous” became standardized terms that reduced dynamic human 
societies to static entities that subtly commented on their level of political evolution 
towards centralization. This ability to write and transform the real world into textual 
images of human assumptions was key in confirming, perpetuating, and rehearsing a 
positive image of chieftaincy in the savannah. As becomes clear in chapter four of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Sean Hawkins, Writing and Colonialism in Northern Ghana (Toronto: University Press, 2002), passim; 
The written knowledge of colonial dispatches represent the unspoken as well as spoken beliefs of the 
colonizer about people subject to colonial rule. These beliefs and assumptions originate in the university 
culture of Europe in the early nineteenth century to shape the “attitudes, values, and theory about the 
world” in the minds of the colonial administrator. Curtin, viii. 
41 Said, 99. 
42 Said, 122. 
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African Institute, 1951), 52; Rattray, Tribes, xv; Meyer Fortes, “The Political System of the Tallensi of the 
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thesis, the textual representation of chiefly zones in the protectorate was another way 
colonizers sought to underline the relative inferiority of non-chiefly inhabited regions and 
thereby create the European modern self-image. 
Knowledge and Power 
The reliance of colonial authority upon textual representations of Africa illustrated 
the historical relationship between power and knowledge. The connection between 
Britain’s growing understanding about chieftaincy and the unfolding of colonial power in 
the Northern Territories confirmed Ania Loomba’s statement that “knowledge [was] not 
innocent but profoundly connected with the operations of power.”44 Loomba belonged to 
a wide circle of post-colonial theorists who pinpoint the linkages between knowledge and 
political control.45 To this end, Loomba described discursive knowledge as an ordering or 
patterning of ideas into a “language” or subtext to the explicit meaning of words.46 When 
wedded to a political or ideological agenda, indirect meanings have the power to direct 
“human practices, institutions, and actions.”47 Similarly, Edward Said used discourse 
analysis to explain the bond between knowledge and colonial power in Africa, Asia, and 
India. He concluded that texts have the power to create “not only knowledge but also the 
very reality they appear to describe,” especially when texts are informing the decision-
making of institutions.48 According to Said, the “Orientalist” texts contained a discourse, 
or subtextual voice, that continued from publication to publication: “Orientalism is after 
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all a system for citing works and authors.”49 Thus, European writers developed textual 
constructions about the ‘Other’ that objectified non-European societies. 
The bureaucratic necessity of institutions formalized Orientalist knowledge into 
seemingly authentic confirmations of reality.50 An Orientalist writer imbued a “style, 
figure of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, [but] not 
the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original.”51 This, in part, 
explained how assumptions and early impressions about the savannah, for instance, 
changed from plainly “textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, 
and even military” justifications for British power in the Northern Territories.52 
According to sociologist Nii’K Plange, as colonial rule in the Northern Territories 
continued into the twentieth century, annual record keeping “formalized” the protectorate 
into a labor pool for “capitalist enclaves” in Ashanti and the Colony and not into an 
economically independent region.53 While initially expecting an array of northern Muslim 
powers, the British in time reshaped their thinking to accept any indication of chiefly or 
centralized rule. To the British mind, the success of their modernizing mission totally 
hinged on competent chiefs to act as intermediaries. Over a few decades, the absence of 
many northern chiefs downgraded the overall civilizing mission into an exercise in 
human resource extraction to serve the southern interior. As this thesis argues specifically 
in chapter three, the policy shift gained momentum as commissioners began representing 
northerners in the Annual Reports largely as bushmen without many qualified chiefs. 
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50 Ibid, 197. 
51 Ibid., 21. 
52 Ibid., 210, 240. 
53 Nii-K Plange, 36. 
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Orientalist in Comparison 
Seeing commonalities between European political history and the socio-political 
structure of centralized societies confirmed to British elites the inevitability of their 
European way of life. In particular, any similarity helped confirm to the British the 
universality of their history that developed the centralized nation-state over centuries.54 In 
part, the British contemplated the modernization of the savannah after seeing aspects of 
their past reflected in powerful chiefly Emirates. British administrators recognized Islam 
as “a kind of 'medieval', 'feudal' and 'despotic' state-formation, not necessarily as 
developed as Western concepts but better than the anarchy of 'pagan' tribalism.”55 For 
example, centralized authority, monotheism, urbanization, textile-production, literacy, 
and systems of taxation all appeared to the British administration in northern Nigeria as a 
Muslim civilizing influence. Furthermore, the British saw market places located in areas 
of Islamic settlement as proving the civility of Muslims because they seemed to control 
local finances.56 All this applause arose despite also paradoxically chastising the Arab 
influence in West Africa as the cause for slavery in the interior—a bane to the progress of 
civilization in the continent.57 Apart from this conflicting view of Islam in the Western 
Sudan, in the end, the Muslim ancestral influence seemed to elevate traditional Africa 
towards European expressions of culture. 
The image of an Islamicized north had compelling force among colonial decision-
makers in the savannah. Before the military occupation of the Northern Territories in 
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1897 and later shift to civil administration in 1906, the Colonial Office believed that 
more advanced, Muslim kingdoms would be the agents of native authority. British 
intelligence gatherers in Ashanti described the most powerful political and economic 
actors of the north as Islamicized Africans earlier that century.58 This belief partially 
rested on a myth of the interior that claimed that Islamic traders and scholars from North 
Africa were responsible for developing widespread Muslim civilizations across the 
savannah.59 The British explorer Mungo Park, in writing about the extensive Muslim 
trade economy along the Niger River, was particularly influential in drawing a picture of 
a sphere of Muslim influence around the deserts of Timbuktu south—possibly to the 
distant fringes of the Ashanti forest.60 
British rule in Northern Nigeria in the early decades of the twentieth century also 
furthered the image of a Muslim dominated savannah. The British maintained their rule 
in the savannah after constructing clear distinctions between superior and inferior 
communities. Thus, after serving as a regional administrator in northern Nigeria, Lord 
Lugard had, by 1920, patented indirect rule as a tactic to maintain order by utilizing 
Muslim rulers to represent the British administration. 
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However, the tribal situation was markedly different further west of Nigeria. 
Ferguson quickly indicated to his handlers in the Gold Coast Government that Emirates 
were not present in the savannah north of Ashanti. Despite this fact, Lugard and A. E. G. 
Watherston, one of the longest serving Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories 
after 1905, shared the widespread opinion among British imperialists that Islam was an 
excellent starting point for civilizing the native.61 Later learning about the Muslim 
ancestry of chiefly rulers helped the British see chieftaincies like they did Emirates: as 
rightful holders of power over the lesser developed, decentralized groups. Seeking to 
duplicate its Nigerian successes, the Colonial Office adjusted its focus towards 
chieftaincies, such as Mamprussi, Dagomba, Wa, Gonja, and Nanumba, as exemplary 
forms of centralized government available for British partnership. 
Orientalist in Contrast 
Treating non-chiefly societies as fundamentally different to European societies 
helped underscore the greatness of European society. The historic influence of Islam in 
the savannah compelled British colonizers to fully realize the crucial difference between 
Europeans and the traditional savannah society: Africans, unlike Europeans, were 
incapable of progress without outside intervention. In his dispatches to Cape Coast, 
Ferguson dismissed the appearance of Emirates altogether and instead featured a more 
elementary, racial, and hierarchical division he saw between “state and state-less” 
societies.62 He relayed that a recent immigration of Muslim trader/warriors began the 
chiefly ancestries but not necessarily formal Emirates as in Nigeria. In so doing, he 
furthered the preoccupation among British colonizers to first see Muslim culture in 
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African society as a civilizing force among traditionally non-chiefly societies, and, 
second, that British colonial rule was essential in fulfilling that mission.63 The chiefs of 
the Northern Territories may have had only a mild cultural grasp of Islam, but the 
religion’s broad historical link to chieftaincy in the whole of the savannah continued the 
influential British perception of a link between Islam and civilization that Lugard helped 
to develop in Nigeria. In later years of colonial rule in the Northern Territories, the quasi-
Muslim chiefs appeared “more intelligent and industrious by nature than the negro of the 
coast lands,” explained Gold Coast Governor Hodgson: “they have advanced 
considerably further in civilization.”64 Even more so, by applauding the influence of 
Muslims in the area Ferguson also helped foster a disapproving criticism among British 
colonizers towards non-chiefly groups untouched by Islamic culture. 
Looking for a way to simplify the dizzying ethnic diversity of the region, the 
initial British publications adopted the historical perspective of regional chiefs who 
identified the vast non-chiefly communities as an enslaved class of pagans and idol 
worshipers.65 As a result of the practice, local ethnic names for non-chiefly groups, 
conceived by powerful Muslims, such as Dagaba, Grunshi, and Lobi, “began to denote 
lack of civilization, political anarchy and nakedness—connotations the colonial masters 
subsequently adopted.”66 When they arrived to the Northern Territories, the British 
assumed the local Muslim perspective of non-chiefly groups, a view the British 
welcomed considering their high esteem of Islamic culture and its effects in the savannah. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Marion Johnson reminds readers that Ferguson routinely spoke about furthering “our way of life” and the 
benefits of “our civilization” in the savannah in his correspondence to his British handlers at Cape Coast; a 
curious statement considering his ethnic Fante background. “Shorter Notice,” Journal of African History 
(1976), 17: 638. 
64 Gold Coast Colonial Secretary F. M. Hodgson, cited in Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, 386. 
65 Lentz, 73, 76, 80. 
66 Lentz, 23. 
	  	   24	  	  
In the end, the combination of values strengthened the cultural divide between non-
chiefly groups and the British and helped secure the savage and backwardness image of 
the savannah. 
Importantly, Ferguson’s influential negative perspective about the savannah was a 
result of both his southern Akan heritage and vocational training at the university 
establishment in London. In fact, the coastal region was a site for a dynamic triangulation 
of negative perceptions about northerners from the British, the Ashanti, and their Muslim 
attendants. The growing British negativity towards non-chiefly groups reflected the 
common view of the north held by Akan chiefs and influential Muslim associates in 
Ashanti. Clearly, Gold Coast officials appropriated the Ashanti or Akan “mental map” of 
the people and landscape of the savannah. In his 1992 study, On Mental Mapping 
Greater Asante, historian Ivor Wilks argued for further study into how pre-colonial 
“practices, procedures, and mentalities” influenced the colonial perspective of space and 
identity in West Africa.67 His study illuminated how early nineteenth century British 
agents Thomas Bowdich and Joseph Dupuis used the Ashanti view of space to envision 
the Asante Confederacy while visiting Kumasi.68 Wilks’ contention about the cultural 
exchange between British and Ashanti agents illustrated the likelihood that British 
intelligence gathering borrowed Akan, and, considering the influence of Muslims in 
Kumasi, Muslim perspectives about the savannah.69 
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These dual uses of knowledge—of the ongoing comparison and contrast between 
the savannah and British culture—used and contributed to the enduring positive 
representations of chieftaincy to ultimately serve the European modern image. With the 
superiority of chieftaincy and the inferiority of non-chiefly groups well imagined, the 
British focused on the principles of indirect rule and supported the few strong chiefs they 
encountered while fabricating chiefly rulers over the even more numerous decentralized 
communities of the savannah. 
Non-Chiefly Groups and the Problems of Indirect Rule 
 The British struggled to implement strategies of indirect rule over the honeycomb 
of politically decentralized communities.70 The administration considered non-chiefly 
groups prone to indiscriminate violence and unable to self-govern and cooperate with 
British officers. The British pursued two tactics in these areas. First, the resistance of 
non-chiefly groups attracted the military aggression of the colonizers as a means to create 
peace and order and ensure the security of economic development. Second, as an 
alternative to military aggression, the administration installed chiefs that theoretically 
could integrate dozens of village-compounds local hierarchies into presumably 
controllable groups. 
The first British tactic against non-chiefly groups was the use of military force. 
The colonizers arrived to the Gold Coast and the savannah as a superior military power 
that could defeat any symmetrical armed resistance but not without difficulty caused by 
asymmetrical forms of resistance, such as guerilla-styled attacks and non-conformity. 
Although the British lost the initial battles, in the longer term the better-equipped colonial 
military routinely defeated the Ashanti. 	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 The Northwest Province of the protectorate was a key location of resistance and 
subsequent British violence. Constructing telephone lines, postal services, and roadways 
provided communication and increased trade in the protectorate. But these features of 
European civilization required local security, either from cooperative chiefs over their 
villages, or from the use of force among the Grunshi, the non-chiefly peoples of the 
savannah.71 These wild areas of the protectorate openly resisted British forces, such as 
through looting caravans, but more often employed the “weapons of the weak” through 
tactical evasions and non-compliance with tax regimes or supply carriers.72 At other times 
Africans attempted to settle local disputes by playing on the British mandate to promote 
peace and order.73 
 As a second approach in non-chiefly regions, the British faced the prospects of 
long-term rule by installing chiefs from prominent villagers. Recalling what the British 
learned in the Anglo-Ashanti Wars, the northern "indigenous states were easier to 
conquer and control through their hierarchies" than what the numerous decentralized 
communities presented.74 Conversely, chieftaincy groups were only successful if and 
when the British underestimated their foe, as the British initially did during their first 
clashes with the Ashanti. Even in areas with some centralized authority through minor 
chiefs or headmen, such as in Lobi, the British gained a small measure of control.75 While 
the administration appointed chiefs to integrate decentralized groups like the Konkomba, 
the British also needed to increase their visits and extended stays via a system of 
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guesthouses to “continually support” the chiefs.76 In fabricating chiefly hierarchies, for 
example, “the British colonial authorities basically engineered the subjugation of 
Konkombas and allied clans under the ruleship of the chiefs.”77 When communities like 
the Konkomba, Lobi, or Tallensi opposed the isolated outposts, the administration 
interpreted the resistance as proof of the degeneracy of non-chiefly societies and their 
unwillingness to civilize. 
At the same time indirect rule created some serious problems that undermined 
British control and legitimacy in the protectorate. By the 1930s, Gold Coast 
anthropologist Ronald Rattray reported from villagers that chiefs gained uncustomary 
degrees of power and wealth and often extorted the peasantry.78 Instructed to assist the 
administration to produce an indirect styled approach to colonial rule developed in 
Nigeria, Rattray confirmed in detail the opinion of the administration that the years of 
supporting, and more often completely fabricating, chiefly rulers was producing local 
unrest and negative feelings among villages towards the British-backed Warrant Chiefs. 
Throughout the Northern Territories, the vast array of district level Native Authorities 
created a “decentralized despotism” that ordinary peasants often despised.79 
The powerful Native Courts transformed customary legalities into rigid written 
legal codes without offering any internal accountability process except to British staff.80 
Mamdani argued that British counterfeiting of chiefs in decentralized West African 
society “shifted” the alliances of ordinary men and removed the “popular” and “peer” 
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restraints that functioned in much of Africa.81  He further complained that the British 
assumed “a chief on every piece of administrative ground” in Africa, and when 
confronted with diffuse political boundaries and little centralized government, the 
colonizers simplified ethnic distinctions through creating new or imagined political 
allegiances.82 As a result, in some African colonies the British had to respond to 
significant revolts, such as those in Tanganyika, Igboland, and Nigeria.83 In the Northern 
Territories, non-compliance and routine violent disruptions to caravan routes were the 
manifestations of local resistance. As was also the case in the Northern Territories, the 
British responded to the “decentralized despotism” problem in two ways: first, by 
offering a salary to chiefs to preemptively satisfy their need for financial gain; and, 
second, by instituting more British control over the selection and removal of chiefly 
rulers.84 
A vital contradiction appeared while Britain increasingly contemplated indirect 
rule after 1900. Most in the Colonial Office seemed to miss the quandary in attempting to 
preserve traditional chieftaincy as a vehicle for modern self-rule, infrastructure, and other 
aspects of European civilization. At some point in the endeavor, a tipping-point between 
the balance of African tradition and material/socio-political progress must occur. An 
example of this problem emerged after Britain spent much of the nineteenth century 
degrading and eventually shattering the Asante Confederacy and the power of the 
Asantehene. However, when the Gold Coast Government commissioned Ronald 
Sutherland Rattray to assess Ashanti “native institutions,” British intentions were to 
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somehow preserve and utilize traditional Akan chieftaincies.85 Like many in the Gold 
Coast, he saw not only Ashanti, but also the whole of the Akan-speaking region of the 
forested Gold Coast as a “nation” that the colonial administration in turn framed as a 
“‘breakwater’” against the “‘waves of Western civilization.’”86 The paradox became clear 
when, around the same time, the Northern Territories Chief Commissioner clearly 
believed the British “Juggernaut” retained the initiative over African tradition: 
The speed of material development in the Gold Coast is such that within the 
next decade all traces of native thought, religion, and inspiration will be 
erased or flattened out in the heavy wheel-tracks of the petrol-driven cars of 
the Juggernaut of commercialism.87 
 
Thus, the effort to create modernity by preserving tradition created an impossible, 
circular task for British social engineers. Nevertheless, the civilizing activity 
continued into the twentieth century, when the British Empire targeted chiefly 
communities of the savannah to mediate the progression of modernity. 
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2. Travel and diplomatic literature 
The establishment of colonial rule in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 
Colony reflected the British preoccupation with chieftaincy representing human progress. 
The British gained control over the region in 1898 after Ferguson negotiated treaties with 
northern chieftaincies believed to control local politics and trade.88 Examining his 
correspondence reveals that the British affirmation of chieftaincy adapted a popular 
imaginary about the interior grasslands of West Africa. 
George Ferguson was a member of the growing educated African elite working 
for the Gold Coast government before the turn of the eighteenth century. Gold Coast 
Governor, William Griffith, recognized that African agents were necessary to assist the 
British expansion into the interior.89 Hiring local staff meant paying lower wages and 
having field officers with greater immunity to malaria and sleeping sickness in the so-
called White man’s grave of British West Africa.90 Although Ferguson was not British, 
his European cartography training and experience in West African negotiations allowed 
him to become an influential voice praising chieftaincy to the Colonial Office. By birth, 
Ferguson was a Fante, the coastal ethnic group who served as middlemen in the European 
trading partnership with the Asante Confederacy. After primary education in Sierra 
Leone, he gained employment as a teacher in the Wesleyan School at the Cape Coast, 
and, while serving as a government clerk from 1881, designed a map for the British about 
local people living among the settlements on the Gold Coast. His talent for identifying 
ethnic distinctions helped Ferguson progress through the colonial political service and 
eventually graduate with distinction from the London Royal School of Mines in 1890. 	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After serving in negotiations on behalf of the British in the interior of the Gold Coast, 
Ferguson worked as a Surveyor of Roads with the Gold Coast Public Works 
Department.91 Yet, the highlight of his career, which supports the focus of the discussion 
below, was that he was able to singlehandedly increase British control over the hinterland 
north of Ashanti in 1897.92 
Ferguson reflected the view about the wild and backwards society of the savannah 
shared by his British superiors and his Akan heritage. Ferguson’s writing revealed his 
total embrace for the British civilizing mission.93 As an intermediary between the Cape 
Coast and Ashanti, Ferguson likely understood that Muslims were key players in the 
Ashanti court. The Muslim agents attending the Ashanti king during his few visits to the 
south were the only real links that coastal outposts had to savannah society.94 The 
northerners appeared to the Fante and the British as impressive monotheists and literate 
Hausas with the power to tender yearly tributes of slaves from a spiritually dark land. 
The Ferguson mission was the first British expedition into the plains between 
Kumasi, the capital of the Asante Confederacy, and the desert trading city of Timbuktu. 
Before his travels, the British Colonial Office envisioned bands of Muslim warlords 
dominating the trade and politics of the region. The London office previously relied on a 
series of reports from British agents who only visited the boundaries of the Gold Coast 
hinterland. In particular, the combined narratives of Mungo Park, Thomas Bowdich, 
Joseph Dupuis, and Heinrich Barth described the people of Dagomba, Gonja, and Mossi 
as Muslim slave raiding kingdoms and competitors to Asante power. Despite this 	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convincing picture, Ferguson cast a contrasting image of the north absent of Muslim 
States while reporting from the center of the savannah. 
Ferguson pointed towards chieftaincies instead of Emirates as holders of political 
power. In addition, he suggested that the few chiefly groups often professed their 
dominance over a myriad of village compounds that were without traditions of 
centralized authority. After meeting countless chiefs, village headmen, and African 
spiritualists, Ferguson also proposed to London the Muslim ancestry of chiefly lines, and 
the resulting political office of the chief, as a unique and distinguishing feature of 
savannah society. Ferguson reported that, in previous centuries, bands of Islamic traders 
immigrated to the savannah and introduced centralized rule to a handful of otherwise 
non-chiefly groups. In turn, the British applauded the appearance of chieftaincy as a 
fortunate cultural trait for Africans whom they perceived as incapable of independent 
change. Importantly, Ferguson’s correspondence helped popularize official British 
sentiment in West Africa that the rise of Islamic culture in the savannah elevated tribal 
society. Indeed, describing the superficial practices of Islam among chieftaincies was one 
way Ferguson perpetuated this belief in the minds of administrative officers in the 
Northern Territories. 
The view that chieftaincies were the more advanced tribes helped the protectorate 
administration think chiefs were local partners in the civilizing mission. As such, 
indications of the British mission linking arms with local chiefs appeared in the opening 
years’ administrative correspondence from the Northern Territories. The work of British 
officers in developing the northern region into interconnecting profitable agricultural 
districts was a major tactic in achieving this strategic goal. Besides creating western 
styled markets in the savannah, the civilizing mission required establishing the 
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protectorate as a peaceful and orderly society. In their other civilizing goals, such as 
fighting slavery and kidnappings, thefts, and murders, the British advanced their practice 
of building relationships with local chiefs as willing mediators to government law and 
order policies. 
In contrast to the positive image of chieftaincies, senior administrators in the 
Northern Territories categorized non-chiefly peoples, such as Fra-Fra, Lobi, and Dagarti, 
as more savage and stressed that they would oppose British impositions of law and 
order.95 A major example to the British of the inferiority of non-chiefly groups was 
recognizing chieftaincy as a form of power subjugating non-chiefly areas. Thus, 
influencing and supporting chiefly rule was also an effort to extend colonial authority 
over non-chiefly areas the British believed were typically wild, savage, and infantile. 
Building upon the increased security provided by chiefly districts, British commissioners 
built up their presence throughout the north by constructing guesthouses that bolstered 
routine staff visits into non-chiefly districts. 
Myth(s) of the Interior 
During the hundred years before Ferguson’s mission, the Colonial Office had 
some reason to believe that Islam might have held a more contemporary place in the 
savannah. The myth of the interior, a misrepresentation of West African politics 
dominated by powerful Muslims, first appeared in British texts published by the African 
Association during the late 1790s. Similar to the discussions in academic and religious 
circles about the Orient in the early nineteenth century, the British Colonial Office did 
not rely on any “real discussions between Christians and Muslims” but only on their 
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perceptions of Islamic culture civilizing Africans.96 What follows is a brief outline of 
British sources that underpin the Ferguson mission and the official British belief to that 
time that Muslims dominated the savannahs of the Northern Territories. 
In his posthumous travel journal, Travel in the Interior Districts of Africa, Mungo 
Park (1790) described extensive Muslim networks for the trade commodities of Egypt 
and the Barber Coast into Timbuktu, situated on the Niger River. Park actually intended 
his voluminous descriptions of the African interior to illuminate for his late eighteenth 
readers their intellectual darkness about the heart of the continent. He did this by 
highlighting the brutalities of slaving rulers over a continent of nameless and savage 
people in need of colonial “cultivation.”97 From Timbuktu, goods traveled further south to 
distant townships of the savannah and forested interior Guinea Coast. 
The first face-to-face encounter between the Asante Confederacy and the British 
Empire in 1807 further reflected the myth of the Muslim interior. The meeting impressed 
upon the Colonial Office a high probability that Muslim chiefs operated north of Kumasi. 
The Asante King, Osei Bonsu, led a military force in pursuit of a handful of Asante 
criminals against Colonel Torrane, the British Governor of the coastal Fort at Anomano. 
Reminiscing on the negotiations that followed the first of six Anglo-Ashanti Wars, 
Torrane considered the Asante “advanced in civilization to the people of the waterside.”98 
He wildly announced that, “in fact the Moors seem to have spread over the whole interior 
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of Africa” because Quaranic talismans adorned King Bonsu and that the King’s closest 
advisors all appeared to be Muslim scribes.99 
The Bowdich and Dupuis missions further deepened the myth of the Muslim 
interior by detailing the presence of slave raiding, Muslim emissaries to the Asante 
court.100 The Gold Coast government sent Bowdich and Dupuis in two separate 
diplomatic missions to negotiate peace with the Ashanti chief over trade access routes 
from the forest to the European coastal forts. By following the Bowdich expedition, 
Dupuis was Cape Coast’s second failed diplomatic attempt to establish peace with the 
Asantehene and settle trade disputes between Kumasi and the interior coastal states. 
Similar to the instructions the Cape Coast Governor gave Ferguson, Bowdich and Dupuis 
had secondary orders from Britain to gather intelligence about what the British suspected 
in 1807 as a Muslim north extending past the ninth parallel of latitude north of Kumasi.101 
Park’s imagination of the interior persuaded the British Treasury Office to instruct 
Bowdich to gain any further understanding about the interconnection between the Sahara 
and the grasslands.102 Important to the Bowdich mission, which took place in 1817, was 
finding southern access points to the Niger and Joliba rivers described by Park. These 
rivers were legendary desert trading networks to the British where Park drowned trying to 
establish contact with the local Muslim kings.103 In 1819, the Governor of Cape Coast 
Castle, John Hope Smith, charged Bowdich to discover “what nation are the Moors that 	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frequent the Ashantee country, and for what purpose do they go there?”104 The British had 
no firsthand experience with the people and territory south of Timbuktu to Kumasi, and 
the Colonial Office could only deduce that the influence of Muslim slavers extended all 
the way south into Ashanti. Should the then dire political situation between the British 
and the Asantehene improve, the Colonial Office hoped to gain safe and direct trading 
access further inland with the so-called savannah Muslims. The British hoped their first 
political missions further inland of the Gold Coast forts would be able to make contact 
with and establish economic alliances with the Muslim kings whom they increasingly 
saw dominating the landscape north of Kumasi. 
Hutchison, the writer and future British resident to Kumasi with the Bowdich 
mission, described to his British readers in 1817 the amulets, pieces of Quaranic verse 
tied to weapons, necklaces, and silk clothing that adorned important Muslims individuals 
from “remote territories.”105 Bowdich identified these foreigners to Kumasi as Dagomba 
representatives from a distant Islamicized West African tributary to Kumasi. For 
instance, accompanied by an entourage of young men and boys, a significant “Moor” 
named Baba often visited Bowdich, who resided in the guest quarters of the 
Asantehene.106 Baba affirmed to Bowdich that European manufactured firearms enabled 
the Ashanti to subjugate the “Dagwumba,” which Bowdich highlighted as a chieftaincy 
of accomplished equestrians that controlled many trading outposts along the northern 	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frontier of the Asante Empire.107 Illustrating the wealth, economic diversity, and relative 
power of the northern Emir, the Dagomba paid the Ashanti a yearly tribute of 500 slaves, 
200 cows, 400 sheep, 400 Cotton-cloths, and 400 silk cloths.108 
Before his meeting with the Asante King, Bowdich passed another group of  
people  dressed as “Moors,” a group of seventeen men “arrayed in large cloaks of white 
satin, richly trimmed with spangled embroidery; their shirts and trousers were of silk, and 
a very large turban of white muslin was studded with a border of different-coloured 
stones.”109 Similarly, a number of servants appeared at court wearing “red caps and 
turbans, and long white shirts, which hung over their trousers.”110 Without going into 
further detail of individual cases here, it is clear that Dupuis, in his report, also went to 
great lengths to provide many superficial examples of Islamic cultural affinities in 
Ashanti.111 In the end, Hutchison reported that Bowdich was unable to ask the Asantehene 
directly about northern chieftaincies because the King suspected the Bowdich mission 
was part of a larger British plan for war.112 Clearly, Bowdich provided the British detailed 
textual evidence of a Muslim presence in Ashanti that suggested a greater Islamic power 
to the north. These details resonated with the British ideas about a non-African cultural 
influence that further suggested the social and political advancement Islam appeared to 
bring to tribal Africa. As a result, the Dupuis mission to Kumasi reflected an intentional 
shift towards Britain possibly making contact with the advanced Muslim powers of the 
savannah. 
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Representing the Gold Coast Government in the subsequent mission to Kumasi, 
Dupuis argued that Islamic society elevated politics in West Africa. Upon reading from 
Bowdich, what seemed to be a close relationship between Islam and political control in 
the north, the Colonial Office recognized Dupuis as a suitable representative to replace 
Hutchinson as British resident to Kumasi.113 In particular, Dupuis’ experience as an 
Arabic speaking British Emissary to the Barbary Coast allowed him to seek out Muslim 
interpreters to the Asantehene, or Asante King.114 Dupuis’ experience with Muslim 
authorities in Morocco suggests decision-makers in London intended to establish 
relationships with other powerful Muslim agents south of the Sahara. Dupuis himself 
viewed his mission to Kumasi as another venture into the Muslim interior recalling his 
previous mission in north Africa.115 
Dupuis created an image of a Muslim interior south of the Niger River that most 
corresponded with Park’s earlier descriptions of an ascendant Islam in West Africa. 
Dupuis wrote at length about the Ashanti debt to Muslim warlords in establishing the 
Asante Confederacy in the eighteenth century. Dupuis gained the Muslim view of 
Ashanti history from Bashaw, a powerful Dagomba court attendant to the Asante king 
(Asantehene).116 Dupuis related the common view among local “heathens as well as the 
Moslems” that an “early age of Islam” established the Ashanti as leaders in the interior 
Guinea forest.117 He described a former alliance between powerful Muslims and the 
“[h]eathens of Ashantee, Banna, Juabin, and other tributary states in the North” that 
fought the Denkira in establishing Kumasi as the center of the Asante Empire in around 
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1721.118 In Dupuis’ time, the “Ashantee” were the most powerful of the African powers 
along the Gold Coast. Suggesting that a Muslim northern state was somehow responsible 
for establishing the Asante Confederacy significantly elevated the image of chieftaincies 
to the Colonial Office. 
The Dupuis contribution to the myth of the interior also included the belief that the 
ancestors of Dagomba and Gonja were descendent from ancient Egypt two centuries 
before Christ.119 He further described Hausa, Gonja, and Dagomba as some of the most 
prominent savannah societies in West Africa. The Dagomba capital and trading center of 
Yendi, according to Dupuis, “is said to be at least four times as extensive as the capital of 
Ashantee.”120 He typified the inhabitants along the Volta River basin, such as the 
Dagomba, Hausa, Wangara, and others, as masters over an extensive commercial 
network.121 Thus, Dupuis’ political background and human intelligence sources in 
Kumasi were pivotal to his contribution to seeing the ascendency of Islam along the 
Volta River basin. 
The myth of the interior appeared in another travelogue reminiscent of Park’s 
writing decades after the Bowdich and Dupuis missions. One of the clearest accounts 
about the ability of Islam to “enlighten” the darkness of the African mind comes from 
Henry Barth. Barth was a sought after African expert accompanying a team of British 
Abolitionists who set out via Tripoli to cross the Sahara with support from the British 
Foreign Office in 1849. His proficiency in Arabic and experienced capabilities for 
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navigating great distances were indispensable credentials for the mission.122 Barth saw 
Islam as the only saving grace among the “barbarians”: 
My statements will serve at the same time to prove that the Blacks, whom 
we consider as barbarians, so far from being wholly destitute of intelligence, 
are very little behind the generality of the peasantry of Europe. The 
Mahometan religion, professed by almost all the African nations that I have 
visited, has enlightened their minds, softened their manners and abolished 
those cruel customs which are retained by man in a savage state.123 
 
Fascinatingly, his comments also typify the British assumption that Africans are 
dependent on outside intervention to civilize their essentially “savage state”. 
Moreover, Barth hoped his 1856 travelogue, Travels and Discoveries in North and 
Central Africa, would unveil to science “a most extensive tract of the secluded African 
world” for the ultimate hope of fostering an ongoing European and West African 
relationship.124 He claimed that he had created positive relationships with “all the most 
powerful chiefs along the [Niger] River up to the mysterious city [of Timbuktu] itself.”125 
Barth’s three volumes revealed the most details about the potential economic 
centers of the savannah that were later useful to the Ferguson mission in 1896. Barth 
described the dominance of the Songhai Caliphate over the whole of society north to the 
Niger River and south to the people of Gruma. At the same time, he underlined the 
tenacity of Mossi, a people he perceived as a collection of semi-independent tribes 
descending from the Fulbe. Barth also located the market townships of Yendi (the 
Dagomba capital) and Salaga (the Gonja capital) on a road connecting Kumasi to further 
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northern townships, such as Gambaga, the capital township of the “Chokoshi.”126 Finally, 
the marauding of Zabarma mercenaries into the savage areas of the savannah also 
appeared in Barth’s writing.127 By 1900, the northern administration would come to 
routinely focus on the Gruma, Mossi, Dagomba, and Gonja as key African communities 
to come under British rule. Additionally, the British also became concerned about the 
long-term negative effects of the Zabarma slave-raiders on non-chiefly areas when 
attempting to control the Northern Territories. Thus, in attempting to contact Muslim 
powers of the north vis-à-vis Ferguson, the Colonial Office came to believe that the 
Dagomba, Gonja, and Mossi represented the major African powers of the north. 
With these various writings in mind, in preparing Ferguson, the Gold Coast 
authorities acted on existing intelligence reports that the Dagomba, Gonja, and Mossi 
were foremost Muslim states. On April 25 1892, the Governor at Cape Coast Castle, 
William Brandford Griffith, instructed Ferguson to negotiate treaties with “Dagomba, 
Gonja, Gourounsi, and Mossi.”128 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord 
Knutsford, had decided that establishing treaties of friendship and trade with indigenous 
authorities would ensure British victory over Germany and France in establishing power 
over the region north of Ashanti. 
Ferguson helped create for British decision-makers a tendency to think chiefly led 
communities were advanced African communities of Muslim descent. In doing so, the 
British pictured Chiefs instead of Muslims as best representatives of local authority. 
Ferguson equated chieftaincies, especially the Dagomba and Gonja, as potentially 
stabilizing forces among the presumably chaotic wilderness of the northern grasslands. 	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He suggested that had the British been more aggressive after defeating Kumasi in 1874, 
the Gold Coast could have quickly gained Dagomba and Gonja as allies, since he 
confirmed that both groups were unhappy tributaries of the Asantehene.129 In addition, 
Ferguson applauded the Dagomba and Moshi use of horses and modified Danish long-
rifles to gain political power as examples of “civilized” mastery of animals and 
technology.130 To Ferguson, the establishment of Dagomba, as well as Moshi and Gruma, 
were a result of past military conquests of “Moorish riders” against the resident Grunshi 
and other “inhospitable barbarous tribes” that seemed to swarm the countryside.131 The 
Colonial Office would have recognized the Dagomba from the accounts of Bowdich and 
Dupuis describing the Dagomba as a leading Muslim savannah power, and thus had 
reasonable concerns. In reporting to London about how the Boundary Commission 
divided Dagomba into German and British controlled areas, Special Commissioner 
Kenney described the Dagomba as a “quarrelsome, turbulent race...bitterly opposed to 
any white domination.”132 However, this early note is an ironic portrayal, since, as this 
thesis clarifies, the British soon praised the Dagomba as a compliant chiefly group 
helping to fortify colonial authority into the 1930s. 
The Ferguson correspondence also reflected the superficial descriptions of the 
north found in the writing of previous political missions into the interior. In step with the 
hundred-year Orientalist depiction of the savannah, he continued the interpretation of 
what seemed to be indications of Muslim culture among chiefly groups to help signify 
their superiority over their non-chiefly neighbors. For instance, he identified the 
production of Arabic-styled, dyed textiles as important achievements separating “more-	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savage tribes (such as Gurunshi, Busiansi, Pampamba &c.)” from their evolved chiefly 
neighbors: 
in Gonja, Dagomba, Mosi, Gruma, and the Hausa countries, the people 
weave their own cloths, dye them in different shades of indigo, black, and 
yellow, and adopt the well-known garb of the Mohommedan-professing 
tribes of Africa.133 
 
Here, Ferguson plainly ascribed superiority to people that seemed to reflect a “well-
known” European image of Muslim society in North Africa or Arabia. “The practices of 
Islamism,” Ferguson noted, “have introduced many Arabic names of persons…as well as 
Mahommedan marriage rites. Polygamy is practiced.”134 In all, the appearance of textiles, 
Arabic names, and Islamic marriage ceremonies at least challenged the British 
expectation of savage Africa as naked, illiterate, and prone to sexual immorality. By these 
descriptors, Ferguson echoed the British-European evaluation of human progress typical 
of the Orientalist tradition. 
The description of similarly robed chiefs and Muslim attendants figured 
throughout Ferguson’s description of various districts in Gonja. In addition to textile 
manufacture, Ferguson also noted that housing construction in Gonja utilized flat 
rooftops instead of the typical West African conical thatched designs. These dwellings 
appeared within various “walled towns” that recalled the memory of fortified cities in 
medieval Europe, Mesopotamia, or Egypt.135 The many references to what appeared to 
show the pervasiveness of Islamic culture among northern chieftaincies illustrated the 
importance the religion had for the British in indicating human progress in West Africa. 
Thus, these key British representatives described northern chiefly groups in 
compelling Islamic cultural imagery. Over time, the perceived connection between Islam 	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and chieftaincy helped bolster the British perception that Africans with centralized 
authority were superior to non-chiefly communities. The Ferguson papers further 
revealed the British capacity to marginalize non-chiefly regions as historically and 
culturally stagnant. His writing also revealed the belief that African innovation required 
outside, or non-African, intervention. In the end, Ferguson helped focus the attention of 
the British towards chieftaincy as a potential source of native control in the Northern 
Territories. British Commissioners in the protectorate in turn sought to develop their 
presence in chieftaincies believing superior tribes ruled the regions and had power over 
inferior non-chiefly groups. 
The Superiority of Chieftaincy 
The belief in the superiority of chiefly groups shaped the early strategy to expand 
British political influence north of Kumasi. The early British correspondence and 
administrative records from the protectorate point toward two examples illustrating the 
positive image of chieftaincy among the British. First, the cautious reaction to the 
military operations of the Muslim warlord Samory in January 1898 illustrated a healthy 
British respect for chieftaincy. Besides the encroaching French and German positions, the 
British recognized Samory as an imminent danger to the tenuous military position 
headquartered in the township of Gambaga. Second, the diplomatic strategy against 
German and French competition for the territory north of Kumasi drew on the British 
high assessment of chieftaincy. The British believed that treaty agreements with chiefs 
would ensure their legitimacy against the French and German powers operating in the 
vicinity. 
The defensive stance towards Samory revealed a healthy respect for local chiefly 
and Muslim authorities among British officers who held inferior military positions. Eager 
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to develop a profitable agricultural industry in the north, the Colonial Office was 
concerned that Samory’s military operations would interdict the valuable caravan trade 
routes connecting the whole of the West African bulge. Yet, the British decision-makers 
did not want direct confrontation with Samory and hoped that French positions in Cote 
D’Ivoire would take the responsibility to neutralize local disturbances. British policy was 
not to confront Samory unless his forces provoked an altercation. Ferguson suspected that 
Samory’s forces were preparing to continue advancing near to the British position in the 
northwest district of Bona.136 After Ferguson died during Samory’s attack on Bona in 
1897, the British built upon their treaty agreements and established a small military 
administration around Gambaga. By 1898, the British deemed Samory dangerous to the 
peace of Black Volta District, an area further south and outside French control that 
obliged a British response. A few months later, Lieutenant-Colonel Northcott, the first 
commanding officer over the Northern Territories, required Major Walker to fortify Bona 
against further attacks by Samory into the Black Volta.137 Samory’s impressive military 
prowess after the altercation fitted the British conviction about the supremacy of chiefs 
compared to the non-chiefly, “savage and hostile tribes of Lobi.”138 
The second point that illustrated British recognition for the potency of chieftaincy 
was key to Britain’s success during the partition of Africa. The British believed that 
treating with local chiefs was the ideal strategy for beating Germany and France in the 
competition to control the Volta River basin. In 1888 the Boundary Commission between 
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Germany and England agreed on a zone of neutrality north of Ashanti.139 The accord 
preserved peaceful relations along the northern frontiers of German Togoland and British 
controlled Ashanti and Gold Coast. The French presence west of Cote D’Ivoire also 
helped motivate British exploration into land above the ninth parallel yet unclaimed by 
Europeans.140 As such, in 1892, Ferguson signed treaties for Britain with the Bole, 
Daboya, Dagomba, and Bimbila.141 In 1894 Ferguson negotiated further agreements with 
the Wa, Chakosi, Mamprussi, Mossi, and Bona.142 The Ferguson treaties convinced 
Northcott that the British presence in the newly created Black Volta District was valid.143 
Civilizing (the) Chiefs 
The human and economic development of the Northern Territories relied upon the 
British perception that hierarchies existed between chiefly and non-chiefly societies in 
the savannah. The administration continually emphasized their intention to support strong 
centralized regions as locations of secure Native Administration. For instance, Acting 
Governor of the Gold Coast Bryan confirmed in 1905 the British strategy of “supporting 
and emphasizing the position of the paramount native chiefs while, at the same time, 
making them realize their responsibilities, [as] the only practicable system of 
administering this country.”144 The power of centralized government was only the 
beginning to a multi-faceted approach to institute change in the protectorate. Applied to 
protectorate rule, state-power was “only one element, albeit a rather important one, in a 
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multiple network of actors, organizations, and enterprises.”145  With chiefs responsible for 
local security, the British hoped to create new markets and “desires” for new material 
luxuries, such as clothing, as an outward sign of civilization.146 The desire to sustain new 
markets in the protectorate clearly illustrated how the colonizers relied on a complex of 
tactics to create a modern society. 
However, it was during the close, collaborative relationship between the District 
Commissioners and chiefly rulers that the British could more fully articulate the 
civilizing mission. Writing in 1934, anthropologist Meyer Fortes reflected on the “all-
powerful dispenser of impartial justice” that emerged in the person of the British 
administrator working in the protectorate. “The District Commissioner,” Fortes 
explained, was “in direct communication with the chiefs. To them he gives his orders and 
states his opinions. [The chiefs] are the organs by which [the District Commissioner] acts 
upon the rest of the community.”147 The structure of colonial administration hinged on the 
link between district commissioners and paramount chiefs. The district commissioners in 
each province of the Northern Territories received directives from the governor of the 
protectorate in Tamale. On the African side of the arrangement, in the Native 
Administrations, the paramount chief was both the agent of government and the 
traditional paramount authority over subordinate district chiefs their individual village 
heads.148 
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The directives of the administration that were bound up in this hierarchy 
transferred the beliefs and assumptions that emphasized and reproduced the colonized’s 
inferiority to the British. This, in turn, the British remedied by modeling and creating 
European behaviors, institutions of power, and other social “masks” that the colonized 
figuratively wore.149 The transfer of culture between the British ruler and the African 
subject in this arrangement constructed the European image as modern and civilized and 
the African image as primitive and savage—it was the civilizing process. Catherine Hall, 
an influential contemporary researcher into the internalization of British colonial rule, 
further explained that to “civilize subjects,” the British “required particular disciplines 
too, particular frames of mind and fields of vision as well as … new identities demarcated 
for those who were ruling as well as those who were ruled.”150 In this way, the mutual 
construction of identity for both colonizer and colonized was a self-enforcing rationale 
for British action in West Africa. 
The luxuries of civilization accompanied the growth of commercial agriculture 
and played a key role in changing the thinking of Africans to include modern 
consumption habits. Ferguson pointed out that a main British interest in extending its 
presence north of Ashanti was to manage a series of commercial outposts located on 
caravan roads controlled by key chieftaincies.151 From these overseas positions, British 
manufacturers could sell their finished products while exporting local raw materials to 
European industries: 	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Now it is only by extending our influence northwards and introducing the 
luxuries of civilization to them that we can hope to create a necessity for our 
goods. Powder, guns, kola-nuts, rum, gin, brass and copper rods, flint, 
beads, will sell well. Cotton goods must be produced thick in texture, good 
in quality, and low in price, to replace native manufacture…We must 
develop the resources of those countries by showing the tribes articles such 
as gum, shea-butter, and other products which will be acceptable to us for 
exports.152 
 
British administrators saw their greatest early economic successes developing among the 
chiefly led communities. Morris happily reported the cooperation with the “chiefs” of 
Mamprussi, Dagomba, Gonja, Kintampo, Bole, Wa, and Grunshi in the recent census of 
the Northern Territories. The areas that the British saw as peaceful chieftaincies were also 
candidates for the beginning infrastructure to support future economic growth. For 
example, Morris explained that the transportation of mining equipment to the north 
would develop the Volta River as a transport route to trading centers at Gambaga and 
Kintampo, townships controlled by chiefly rulers.153 
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, administrators began working 
towards reordering the consumptions of Africans in the savannah by developing cash-
based markets to replace subsistence farming. They established “The Trade Goods 
Stores” first in districts where they experienced amiable relations with compliant 
chiefs.154 Chief Commissioner Northcott established the scheme in 1898 to gradually 
replace bartering with modern cash selling for profit.155 By 1901, Gold Coast Governor, 
Major Nathan, advised the Colonial Office to persevere in supporting the various stores, 
especially in Wa that had recently fallen into neglect.156 
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The administrative successes with chiefly areas reflected Ferguson’s assurance of 
the superiority of centralized authority. Commissioners expressed the idea that most of 
the chiefs of the protectorate recognized the benefits of keeping looters at bay—a further 
sign of the supposedly advanced nature of chiefly lineages. Watherston asserted that 
many of the “paramount chiefs” throughout the districts were inclined to cooperate with 
their counterpart British Commissioners in order to ensure their prosperity. Watherston 
hoped that local tribes would “consolidate themselves under a chief of good reputation” 
and hasten the stability of the area and encourage the development of outside traders.157 
The British also saw chiefly districts as orderly candidates for productive revenue 
streams. The effort to create taxation schemes founded on the perceived authority of the 
chief in the protectorate was a classic strategy for the British to gather finances and signal 
their absolute control. The political connection between the British administrator and 
African chiefs in the tax arrangement set into motion the problems associated with 
indirect rule that the Colonial Office would wrestle with in later decades. Unrestrained 
power over the peasantry, contends Mahmood Mamdani, was the result of rule through 
chiefs: 
It is the chief who has the right to make a bylaw governing his locality, 
who assesses the value of your petty property and therefore how much tax 
you pay, who comes to collect that tax, who fines you if you fail to pay 
that tax, who jails you if you fail to pay the tax and the fine, who decides 
where you labor when in jail, and who releases you upon termination of 
the sentence. The chief is the petty legislator, administrator, judge, and 
policemen all in one.158 
 
Thus, the British imposition of taxation in the above relationship relied upon the security 
and cooperation found in chiefly areas, such as in Dagomba. The accumulation of power 
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to chieftaincies in the Northern Territories, greatly increased by British backing, was 
immense. 
Noting recent agreements with Dagomba, Governor Nathan recommended to 
Chamberlain that the Colonial Office station an officer at Salaga to collect tax revenue.159 
From similarly secure locations—namely, from chieftaincy areas—commissioners 
recognized the financial and administrative currency of successful systems of taxation. 
As in previous years, Bryan wrote to Chamberlain that local traders have accepted the 
Caravan Tax as a means to protect themselves from “the extortions of petty chiefs and 
serve in some sense as a guarantee of respectability.”160 The paper receipt merchants 
received after paying the tariff on trade routes signaled a professional association with 
Europeans that subsequently increased the credibility of the itinerant traders to other 
Africans. However, having enough staff in the protectorate was an early problem to 
Morris, who in 1901 expressed the need for more officers to enforce the tax at Tumu, 
Bole, Walewale, and Salaga: “I desire to point out that the amount to be realized from the 
collection of caravan taxes altogether depends on the number of officers at one’s 
disposal.”161 Watherston reported that the textile trade via Hausa traders has increased 
dramatically, with many natives “quite suddenly developing a desire to cover 
themselves.”162 In a reference to the decades old myth of the interior, he also recognized 
that recent increases in mercantile activity among Muslim traders had done “more to 
bring about order, decency, and a local cleanliness than years of our administration have 
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effected.”163 With the increases in trading activity, the benefits of a tax on caravan traffic 
were obvious. 
The British increasingly prohibited the slave raiding of chiefly groups into non-
chiefly areas as an important aspect of creating law and order in the Northern Territories. 
Colonial authorities recognized that maintaining their hold over the region depended on 
routine visits to all districts of the new protectorate. For example, in the Chief 
Commissioner’s 1901 report, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Morris wrote that 
kidnappings and other crimes persisted most in areas where his staff had difficulty in 
traveling.164 Conversely, when British officers habitually visited powerful chiefs, such as 
in Dagbon, criminal activity in the area seemed to diminish. For example, for reasons not 
discussed in the annual reports, by 1901 the Dagomba had submitted to British 
authorities; and as a result, Morris happily reported that slave raiding and looting activity 
surrounding Gambaga had ceased.165 
Ferguson stressed that the relative lack of real chiefs required the British to deploy 
the military to further help convince Africans about the legitimacy of British control over 
the Northern Territories. His observations about the north uncomfortably showed the 
Colonial Office that the many non-chiefly groups strongly contrasted British expectations 
of a Muslim north. Quite the opposite, Ferguson described many individuals belonging to 
non-chiefly communities as polytheists, naked, decorated with body piercing of straw and 
beads, and living in loose associations of family compounds. He commented that even 
the sparing use of leaves or textile for clothing among various families of the “Gurunshi” 
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indicated the “luxuries of civilization.”166 In traveling throughout the savannah, Ferguson 
distinguished between chiefly groups and the “Barbarous tribes” of non-chiefly regions 
that included the “Pampamba, Kusasi, Busansi, Grunshi, Lobi, Dafina, Nieniege, and 
Kaprisis.”167 
Ferguson estimated that the majority of non-chiefly communities lived closest to 
the British sphere of influence compared to the German and French. As such, he 
recommended that the Colonial Office quickly deploy military forces to stake the British 
claim over the scattered tribes.168 “As a tribe or district,” wrote Ferguson, “none of them 
is capable of negotiating with a European power, and can only be civilized by force of 
arms.” In response to this categorization, the British resorted to other persuasions, 
namely, “jail sentences and the Maxim,” to gain control over areas without centralized 
authority.169 For instance, Northcott instructed Major Walker to respond decisively 
against possible difficulties the military encountered in any area of the district. “Make a 
display of force,” he ordered to the district officer, “sufficient to make apparent the 
hopelessness of resistance.”170 
The British view of non-chiefly areas as stumbling blocks to establishing 
European law and order confirmed Ferguson’s positive assessment of chieftaincy. But, 
the convenient image of partnership was not a relationship of equity between builders of 
a true human community, either in chiefly or non-chiefly societies of the savannah. 
Acting Chief Commissioner Irvine echoed previous reports that sporadic caravan raiding 
was a problem in the Lobi-Dagarti District. Irvine highlighted the lack of centralized 	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leadership with the Lobi-Dagarti as the reason his staff were unable to curb what the 
administration typified as criminal, or uncivilized, activity.171 The prevailing strategy of 
the administration since 1898 was to punish African chiefs who did not prevent serious 
crimes, such as murder and theft, from occurring in their communities. “In dealing with 
reluctant chiefs,” Northcott instructed to Walker, “you will resort to fines, either in corn 
or in kind, but in extreme cases you may suspend the chief or detain him in custody.”172 
As such, Irvine explained to Bryan that chiefs played an essential part in the maintenance 
of law and order in the protectorate—even if it meant issuing fines or other 
inducements.173 These comments are interesting considering that obedience in response to 
the British military was the real deciding factor in maintaining law and order, despite the 
British rhetoric showcasing chieftaincy as the means to controlling the protectorate. As 
will become clear below, the British dealt with non-chiefly groups and supposedly 
superior but “reluctant” chiefs both in the same manner: control through “force of arms.” 
Thus, colonial rule began a deprivation of power in chiefly zones: “The colonized has no 
way out of his state of woe—neither a legal outlet (naturalization) nor a religious outlet 
(conversion). The colonized is not free to choose between being colonized or not being 
colonized.”174 In the end, chiefs were only superior Africans to the British when they 
obeyed the law. 
The new century brought the British into a new era of colonial control in West 
Africa. The administration entrenched themselves in the Northern Territories first by 
force, but then by a series of Native Administrations rooted in the chiefly office, having 
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realizing their assumptions about a Muslim north in the region were misplaced. Into the 
1920s, the British hold on chieftaincies increased, and colonial policy worked towards 
systems of indirect rule by even appointing chiefly rulers for most of the savannah that 
were without traditions of chiefly authority. 
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Chapter 3 – The Civil Administration 
The Muslim influence in the savannah remained a powerful factor in convincing 
administrative writers to see chieftaincy groups as a positive representation of 
civilization. This chapter focuses on how the British used this version of local history to 
further a perception of a divide between decentralized and centralized communities. By 
repeating the dichotomy between chiefly and non-chiefly groups in their writing, a 
succession of commissioners represented chiefly areas as youthful, model districts eager 
to cooperate with British officials. In contrast, non-chiefly areas more clearly appeared to 
authorities as wild, uncooperative sectors. In turn, the British worked towards 
establishing rest houses and increasing routine visits to non-chiefly districts to enforce 
law and order. While indirect rule intended to embrace tradition, the policy only aimed to 
preserve customs colonizers believed were useful for ensuring total control. 
The retelling of Muslim history in the savannah recalled the Orientalist trend of 
rehearsing knowledge over time, a process with the potential to create new forms of 
reality. For instance, in his 1920 book, The Natives of the Northern Territories of the 
Gold Coast, A. W. Cardinal, the Commissioner for Karachi District, reflected the 
orthodox view of the administration towards chiefly and non-chiefly societies contained 
in the annual reports. His book reflected over twenty years of British involvement in the 
Northern Territories and examined the historical and anthropological images of natives 
under colonial rule. For his study, Cardinal drew upon lengthy quotes from the influential 
British author James Frazer to understand the local Arabic histories of Dagomba.175 After 
years of comparing non-European cultures throughout the European colonial frontier, 
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Frazer concluded that literacy and the division between secular and spiritual authorities 
indicated human progress. The culmination of such knowledge became influential to 
British policymakers in the savannah. The British saw these supposedly progressive 
attributes as common features of the few chiefly led regions of the savannah. The Arabic 
manuscripts showed how Islamic chiefs supplanted the authority of tindana, an illiterate 
class of spiritualist earth-priests that allowed for communal forms of landownership. In 
embracing Fraser’s ideas about human progress, Cardinal held to the British 
administrative view that Muslim immigration into the savannah elevated local society by 
subjugating the superstitious beliefs of tribal Africa. 
The annual reports from the protectorate confirmed how the British organized 
their new bureaucracy around the belief that chiefly groups could facilitate peace and 
order as a prerequisite to the civilizing mission. The strategic goal of colonial rule 
depended on the British successfully employing a variety of means designed to reorient 
Africans around believing their own inferiority compared to the greater culture of the 
British Empire. By overseeing the authority structure of native courts, for instance, the 
British tried to change individuals to think and act out the idea of an ordered, modern 
European identity. 
The Divide Between Chiefly and Non-Chiefly Society 
The British interpreted a variety of effects that Islam brought to the savannah as 
signals of cultural progress away from typically backward savannah culture.176 In 
studying the chiefly realms of the Northern Territories, such as in Dagomba and 
Mamprussi, District Commissioner Cardinal consulted French translations of the Tarikh-
es-Soudan and Tarikh-el-Fettch. These seventeenth century Arabic manuscripts described 	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more than two hundred years of Islamic oral and written history stretching across the 
West African Sudan.177 Yet, like Ferguson’s report on the savannah two decades previous, 
Cardinal dispelled any ideas of a Muslim dominated Northern Territory. Instead, Cardinal 
confirmed that “devout” Muslims comprised less than two percent of the protectorate 
located mainly in the southern districts of Salaga, Tamale, Gambaga, Bole, and Wa, and 
in the northern provinces of Gurupisi, Nasa, and Wahabu.178 Despite recording Islam’s 
small numerical showing in the protectorate census, the British continued to see links 
between a historic Islamic presence and chieftaincy and of the benefits of chiefly rule in 
general. One obvious indication was the influx of literacy in Arabic among chiefly 
societies. The British perceived other markers closely linked to a centralizing trend that 
seemed to accompany chiefly rule. These included the supplanting of earth-priests with 
chiefs as the holders of ultimate authority over politics, law, and landownership. 
Centralization also brought chieftaincies military supremacy over non-chiefly groups, 
which the British paradoxically admired as a sign of greatness but also recognized as the 
root of much of the political and social disorder in the protectorate. 
During the first years of British military occupation in the north, a succession of 
Chief Commissioners began the bureaucratic routine of reporting to the Colonial Office 
in London, via the Governor in Cape Coast, about the policies, attitudes, difficulties, 
successes, and experiences of the northern administration. The notion that chieftaincies 
were civilizationally superior to non-chiefly groups was an essential theme of the opening 
years of administrative reporting from the Northern Territories. These highly organized 
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and detailed summaries highlighted the ongoing British representation of the Dagomba, 
Gonja, Wa, and Mamprussi chieftaincies as dominant colonial districts.179 
The administration claimed chieftaincy regions were advanced, compliant, and 
secure districts to integrate youth, especially from non-chiefly groups, into civilizing 
activities that included military service and capitalist market structures. Establishing a 
coherent colonial regime based on a vision of relative superiority required the systemized 
understanding of savannah culture and history. The British could then catalogue their 
views about the order, legal code, and structure of the protectorate. The transformation of 
British imaginings about ethnicity into realities immortalized in colonial policy illustrated 
the power of the colonial imagination in creating new identities and hierarchies. As 
Benedict Anderson has described it, “the flow of subject populations through the mesh of 
differential schools, courts, clinics, police stations and immigration offices created traffic 
habits which in time gave real social life to the state’s earlier fantasies.”180 
The idea that chieftaincy was a secular form of authority helped Cardinal believe 
chiefly groups were superior to the superstitious earth-shrines of non-chiefly areas. 
Cardinal saw chieftaincy confirming the broader global anthropological argument put 
forward by Frazer that secular authority was more evolved than spiritual bases for 
political power. Yet, Cardinal was reacting to an alien form of spirituality that, like most 
other European travelers outside of the continent, he did not understand and could not 
adequately judge. In this way, colonizers never or rarely appreciated Africans for their 
own merits, but only used their research to justify programs of “urgent change.”181 The 
failure to begin an intercultural discussion to understand real Africans caused British 	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officers like Cardinal to label the earth-shrine as a primitive superstition over inanimate 
objects.182 Opposing terms like secular and superstitious; literate and illiterate; 
centralized and decentralized; young and old; and resistor and obedient became central to 
how colonizers ranked Africans along a continuum of progress. 
The innovation of secular power in the Northern Territories, wrote Cardinal, 
began after a centuries old arrangement between tindanas and migrant Muslim chiefs 
who intermarried among a handful of non-chiefly communities.183 Tindanas were the 
original caretakers of land whose tradition of spiritual authority predated the arrival of 
Muslim chieftaincies.184 In a reflex fitting the Orientalist genre, Cardinal thus imagined 
that the separation of spiritual and temporal offices represented an evolutionary step 
forward. For example, he eloquently explained that Muslims were a “more vigorous 
race” that contrasted with the indigenous priestly orders: “from whose nerveless fingers 
the reins of government slipped into the firmer grasp of men who” better understood 
secular justifications of power.185 Frazer believed the primitive societies endowed priestly 
classes with a measure of power over physical and spiritual realms.186 The fate of the 
tribe lay with the will of the tindana who controlled the spirits inhabiting earthly objects. 
As a result, the village would punish or reward the king as the cause of either destitution 
or prosperity.187 Hence, British officers, who were more acquainted with Islamic tradition 
than the religion of the savannah, put aside their usual negative opinions of Muslims to 
praise their supposedly positive cultural influence. 
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Literate and Illiterate 
The British also interpreted signs of literacy in Arabic among chiefly 
communities as a sign of progress. In turn, the differing rates of literacy among chiefly 
and non-chiefly communities shaped education as a civilizing tool in the savannah. The 
policy towards education and literacy matched British attitudes to native authorities, 
which the colonial officials tried either to strengthen or introduce. Similarly, the British 
responded to signs of literacy by training chiefly lineages in the English language to 
serve the British staff as clerks in addition to acting as colonial mediators as chiefs. 
For example, in 1909, the protectorate administration benefited from placing the 
first Government School in Tamale (Dagomba). The location of the school in the political 
center of Dagbon capitalized upon the British optimism for Dagomba. With a history of 
chiefly rule and an emphasis on Arabic writing and monotheism, the Dagomba appeared 
to the British as more civilized compared to the non-chiefly and illiterate groups of the 
interior. By deepening the scholarly tradition in Dagomba, the British hoped to employ 
the best of its students in various clerical, postal, and agricultural stations in the north.188 
British treasury officers emphasized the importance of integrating a native treasury 
system with the “Emir” and the “principle executive officer” of the aristocracy, “in this 
case in Arabic with scribes learned in English.”189 Chief Commissioner Armitage also 
intended his staff to establish new Government Schools in other chiefly townships 
influenced by Imams, such as in Wa and Bole. By 1916, Armitage wrote that enrolment 
at Gambaga School increased one hundred percent largely from Mamprussi and Bawku 
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students, areas typified by Islamic belief.190 Also, in the town of Bole, the resident Chief 
asked the British to construct a school in the District, which only seemed to convince the 
British that chiefly groups were progressive.191 
The British faced harder work in their mission to the illiterate communities of the 
protectorate. Conversely, station officers had greater roles as educators “in less 
developed units or where there were no responsible Emir[s].”192 In these non-chiefly 
districts, administrators hoped to draw villagers into English language education to begin 
the foundational training towards creating native authorities to serve the British 
regime.193 Part of the reason for introducing education into the savannah was the long-
term hope for the British to train chiefs as mediators of internal tribal disputes. In this 
way, the British could overwrite a new civilizing script in the minds of Africans that 
introduced modern European values, including those of individual property ownership, 
abolition, marriage, and African legal systems.194 However, Chief Commissioner 
Watherston recognized an apparent obstacle to this strategy in non-chiefly societies. 
Mainly, the apparent lack of a widespread system of chiefly rule indicated to him that 
non-chiefly districts did not have a unified legal system. Even with education provided 
by his staff, Watherston also complained about the seeming “imbecility” of the many 
“elected chiefs” from non-chiefly societies. In his view, Watherston estimated that it 
would take two generations before “useful” chiefs appeared in non-chiefly communities. 
His comment seemed to measure the duration his administration would remain as an 
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attentive “watchdog” over African society, while ready to excise the parts of local culture 
that “were repugnant to Western civilization,” such as slavery.195 
The belief that chiefs exercised legal jurisdiction over their communities also 
influenced the British to see chieftaincies as superior to the supposedly lawless non-
chiefly zones. The British largely hoped their field officers would have to have little 
daily influence in resolving local disputes. They hoped local chiefs would to learn and 
obey British “ideas of justice and equity.” For instance, in 1914, Armitage wanted 
African rulers to keep appeals to government about “civil actions” to a minimum: 
Every encouragement has been given to the Chiefs to exercise their authority, to 
hear and determine cases relating to native property, marriage, and other civil 
actions, and to uphold native laws and customs, so long as they are not opposed 
to our ideas of justice and equity. Few appeals from decisions of the Chiefs are 
made to the Commissioners’ Courts, and, as a rule, local authority is exercised 
with greatest moderation.196 
 
Thus, utilizing native legal systems in this manner was another tactic of the British 
civilizing mission. By vetoing the African “laws and customs” that appeared contrary to 
the British version, the colonial regime could change and re-create a modern form of 
ethic in the savannah. 
Military Strength and Weakness 
The British further believed that regional military strength indicated the 
superiority of chiefly groups over non-chiefly societies. The dominant military position 
of chieftaincies in turn helped convince Cardinal and other administrators that chiefs 
were ideal collaborators for British policy intending to hasten the “slow process of 
evolution” in the Northern Territories.197 His philosophy towards partnering with chiefs 
revealed the British emphasis on exercising military and political dominance in the 	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protectorate to achieve their strategic civilizing goals.198 The main indication of the 
military prowess of chieftaincies was the instances of slave raiding of chiefly groups in 
the Grunshi areas. The view that non-chiefly communities were victims of chiefly groups 
consequently helped shape the British intention to institute chiefly authority over 
decentralized areas. While the English government reversed their support of slavery in 
1807, calling it a “sin against God,” in 1907 they nevertheless found some legitimacy for 
supporting chieftaincy on the basis of their slaving past.199 The paradox between the 
British abolition of slavery and their support of historically slaving ethnic groups clearly 
illustrated Mamdani’s view that British colonialism was a series of “diverse” and 
“contradictory” inclinations.200 
Nevertheless, in the outward relationship of power between chiefly and non-
chiefly groups, Cardinal saw a justification for the British policy of placing non-chiefly 
peoples under the power of traditionally superior chiefly groups. At first, the history of 
the tribal relationship was not a continuous narrative of ascendant Muslim warlords. The 
Arabic manuscripts instead revealed to Cardinal the initial rise of Dagomba, Moshi, and 
Mamprussi chiefly power as “a more or less peaceful penetration by bands of exiles, 
fugitives, and robbers.”201 However, the seemingly peaceful nature of chiefly rule must 
have changed by the late nineteenth century. Cardinal pointed out Dagomba chiefs had in 
recent decades pillaged the many “independent [or non-chiefly] tribes,” such as the 
Grunshi, Busansi, Konkomba, and Tchokossi, for slaves.202 Also referring to the earlier 
writing of Dupuis, Cardinal identified slaves from the above non-chiefly tribes as 	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payments to the Asante King in the yearly tribute from Dagomba.203 After the 1860s, 
petty Dagomba chiefs routinely employed Zabarma mercenaries living to the northeast of 
Fadi N’Gurma, in Moshi, to ensure routine payments to the Ashanti. 
Commissioners viewed slave raiding as corroding the development of civilization 
in the Northern Territories. Yet, in holding this view, the British overlooked the 
contradiction that their own strategic civilizing goals were also disruptive to the natural 
order of the savannah—unless the natural development of society in West Africa 
depended on the frequent intervention of a foreign military force. The colonial 
administration in the protectorate was attempting rapid and often violent historical 
change. Yet, British officials were steeped in the British tradition of history, which 
thought political change best occurred gradually; conversely, violent changes, such as 
those introduced by Babatu and Samory, were un-natural disturbances to development.204 
True, the disruptive effects of the Muslim slave-raiders, Samory and Barbatu, in 
the late nineteenth century were a lasting concern, even after the first decade of British 
occupation.205 By 1912, Acting Gold Coast Governor Hugh Clifford measured success in 
the north in part by the degree the administration could halt slave-raiding and other forms 
of “inter-tribal warfare”.206 The years of raiding had taken their toll on the development of 
the social and political structure of the savannah. Ferguson and Wilks point out that the 
administration also recognized Samory and Babatu, and other similarly ambitious 
Muslim warlords, being responsible for disrupting succession traditions in Wa and 
Dagomba. Consequently, the British worked at rebuilding these traditional authorities.207 
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The British commissioners tended to believe that the previous years of violence in these 
communities prevented centralized authority from evolving naturally as well as 
disrupting older chiefly hierarchies among those groups. For instance, Watherston 
blamed Samory and Babatu for the lack of paramount chiefs among the Lobis, Dagartis, 
Grunshis, Kussassis, and other non-chiefly groups.208 The administration consequently 
spent much energy dealing with the effects of Muslim slave raiding by continuing its 
policy of “enlarging the size and reducing the number” of ethnic communities into the 
next decade.209 Watherston advocated that his administration continue its policy of 
appointing paramount chiefs in communities where they appeared absent or ineffective: 
“Much trouble has been taken to divide these people up into their original divisions, and 
to come under the paramount chiefs whom they were in the habit of obeying before 
Samory and Barbatu overran the country.”210 
The view that chiefly communities like Dagomba were militarily superior also 
helped the British to locate institutions of colonial power in chiefly areas. Enlistment into 
the Gold Coast Regiment became a way for villagers, from the Colony and from the 
protectorates in the north and in Ashanti, unaccustomed to European culture to become 
supposedly civilized. Naturally, the British believed that recruits from distant non-chiefly 
communities of the protectorate had greater challenges adjusting to military life than 
Africans who had longer exposure to British rule. Armitage hoped that establishing a 
training center in Tamale would curtail desertions from newly minted soldiers who 
experienced ridicule from the soldiers arriving to Kumasi from the Gold Coast and 
Ashanti Region. Thus, in 1917, Tamale became a staging ground for the Gold Coast 	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Regiment for recruits from the backward districts of the Northern Territories, such as 
from the North-East Province.211 Armitage reasoned that while temporarily barracked at 
Tamale, the “untutored savages” from the North-East Province would learn to wear 
uniforms and eat food more available in the south.212 When Britain eventually discharged 
these African soldiers after the armistice, Armitage wrote that over a thousand “high 
spirited” youth returned to their families and disrespected their “bush men” chiefs and 
mocked their brothers who remained in the villages.213 He seemed to predict the post-war 
disruptions from the cash-laden youth who “could not be expected to pass without 
incident” as they returned home having living a disciplined, paid soldiers life.214 
However, the nature of the turbulence clearly centered on the feelings of superiority 
among the youth who adopted the perspective of the British about the supposed 
backwardness of their northern heritage. 
Chiefly Landlords vs. Priestly Caretakers 
The belief that chieftaincies were superior communities was also related to the 
negative view that the British had of tindanas. But Cardinal welcomed Frazer’s negative 
view of communal land use to interpret the Tariq es Soudan, the Arabic manuscript from 
Timbuktu that described Muslim settlements in the savannah. Drawing from Frazer’s 
Folk-lore in the Old Testament to read the Muslim texts, he underscored “communal or 
tribal” modes of farming as inferior compared to the individually owned land practices of 
Muslim chiefs.215 The Arabic histories claimed their West African patriarchs rarely 
intended to disturb the spiritual connection they encountered between tindanas and the 
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communities of family compounds. Yet, in the end, the Muslim forefathers of Dagomba 
and other chiefly groups imposed their secular approach to authority over the cultural 
fabric of the societies they encountered in the savannah.216 
The belief that chiefs were powerful landowners underpinned the British initial 
hope to develop the Northern Territories into an independent, profitable agricultural 
possession. As in South Africa, creating colonial frontiers into capitalist farming regions 
reflected the civilizing goal of ensuring that farmers marketed their products to cash-
carrying consumers in a bid to “shape new desires, new exertions, new forms of wealth, 
even a new society.”217 Underpinning all of this in the savannah required the colonial 
administration to emphasize that individual chiefly land tenure, and not communal land 
use vis a vis the tindanas, was the best means to steer local inhabitants towards using 
coinage to purchase locally grown food and other goods. As Levtzion pointed out, 
Muslim chiefs had ensured their regional power by providing security to trade routes that 
had connected Dagomba to Timbuktu since c.1700.218 
The British used this view of native authorities to manipulate chiefs into 
articulating modern forms of government control, which, according to Foucault, meant, 
“to properly manage wealth and resources, modes of living and habitation.”219 The 
emphasis here on the word “manage” in this context shows how British colonizers, but 
not African subjects, reserved the proper rights of control. Speaking optimistically about 
the protectorate in 1920, Cardinal highlighted what his administration perceived as the 
economic benefits that their relationships with chiefly landowners could produce in 
control: 	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The population is there; cattle, especially sheep, thrive; the market of the 
Colony seems inexhaustible; the land is rich, producing grain, fibre and 
ground-nuts in abundance; the forest is untouched as yet with its wealth of 
oils, barks and gums. Beeswax, cotton, kapok, strophanthus and grasses at 
present find a better sale on the spot, and European purchasers cannot 
compete with local prices. But, above all, the people are industrious—the 
shortness of the farming season makes for that—and show such energy in 
cultivation, as well as in the local manufactures, that an Accra youth once 
remarked to me that these people would soon surpass in wealth and 
civilization the forest-folk of the Colony and Ashanti, once the question of 
transport is solved.220 
 
The example shows the “hand in hand” connection between what the British saw as 
“furthering civilizing” in the protectorate and developing the material resources of the 
north.221 Notice, too, how Cardinal felt creating railways and motorways was key to 
unlocking not just wealth but also the “civilization” of the savannah. 
The notion that chiefly groups were superior West African societies underpinned 
the British aim to integrate non-chiefly communities into the economic and 
administrative infrastructure they were strengthening in chiefly groups. The British 
perceived in chieftaincies a well-ordered political structure able to control many 
civilizing benefits, such as the function of an active and well-attended market system in 
Dagomba. As such, in 1906, Commissioner Watherston eagerly relocated the Northern 
Territories central administration from Gambaga to Tamale, near the large market-
township in the heart of Dagomba territory.222 Watherston also declared the need to 
construct or refurbish roads throughout the protectorate to connect the important 
economic centers located in chiefly zones. These included links from Ashanti and the 
surrounding German and French controlled colonies into the key Muslim centers like 
Salaga, Gambaga, Tamale, Daboya, Navarro, and Kintampo. 	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Furthermore, trade had increased as a result of British successes against slave 
raiding and Watherston wanted to capitalize on the increased security in chieftaincy-
controlled locations. As a result, he also noted the increased Islamic population in the 
protectorate and explained in detail the associated increase need for a variety of textiles, 
Islamic prayer beads, and similar personal articles.223 Two years later, Chief 
Commissioner Irvine underlined to the Colonial Office the great need to develop the 
“weak class” of chieftaincy throughout the Northern Territories to ensure the continued 
success of agriculture and trade networks.224 Thus, by 1910 the British began to record 
their relationship with the tribes of the Northern Territories increasingly under the title of 
developing “Trade, Agriculture, and Industry” in the protectorate.225 As a sign of their 
initial successes, W. C. F. Robertson, Acting Gold Coast Governor, acknowledged the 
Northern Territories as the primary point of transit for the trade in cattle to both the Ivory 
Coast and into Ashanti as well as to the Colony.226 
As the 1920s began, the Chief Commissioner, Arthur Philbrick, indicated that his 
administration finally completed a useable motorway network linking Kumasi to the 
districts in the north. The road seemed to also signify successful British control by 
allowing their physical presence throughout the protectorate, as well as connecting 
northern markets to the south. For instance, by permitting the Gold Coast Governor to 
travel to Zouaragu, Navarro, Sandema, and Bawku, areas that for years were the locations 
of ongoing resistance to colonial rule, Philbrick calmed fears among the Colonial Office 
that its efforts to civilize the north would fail.227 The successful construction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 ARNT, 1906, 7. 
224 ARNT, 1908, 5. 
225 ARNT, 1910, 6. 
226 ARNT, 1913, 3. 
227 ARNT, 1921, 14. 
	  	   71	  	  
infrastructure in the protectorate thus measured the level of British confidence in chiefly 
rulers providing the local security for the British initiatives. Consequently, the British felt 
the need for regional security greatest in the areas of the protectorate without perceivable 
native authorities. 
Hostility and Obedience 
Africans met the prospects of British control with varying degrees of 
collaboration and strategies of resistance. The British reported that some African subjects 
began using the status symbols of the administration to increase their material standing in 
the new order. Appearing Muslim or claiming Islamic faith to the British was one method 
Africans increased or gained the approval of the whites. In 1911, Chief Commissioner 
Armitage reported that Africans professed Islam to staff officers, but he indicated that 
these displays were likely superficial and due more to ulterior motives.228 For instance, 
chiefs, and especially their apparent Muslim attendants, in the protectorate received 
financial assistance that corresponded to their level of civilization. By 1916, the British 
staff structured a salary plan for chiefs according to the “stage of development” of their 
community.229 As such, commissioners awarded higher salaries to the “native officials” in 
districts the administration labeled as “fully organized.”230 The paramount chiefs, 
headmen, and Muslim scribes from prominent chieftaincies, like Mamprussi, Dagomba, 
and Gonja, received the highest yearly wage. Interestingly, the Native Treasury record in 
this scheme revealed that British officers in the protectorate referred to paramount chiefs 
as Muslim “Emirs”; similarly, his closest assistant the British labeled  “Waziri,” the 
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traditional Hausa tax collector, judicial officer, and second in command.231232 Cardinal’s 
time, enterprising villagers often claimed to be from Mamprussi or Moshi by attempting 
to speak Hausa (Arabic), professing Islamic belief, wearing Muslim-styled clothing, and 
riding horses in order to increase their status among officials. 
Another example of the colonized using British perceptions surrounded the public 
claims by the Mamprussi paramount to his ascendancy over an array of non-chiefly 
communities of the upper northeast, such as the Yagaba, Lobi, Tallensi, and Builsa. Over 
the years, chiefs watched British staff build Native Courts that gave a new kind of legal 
status to chiefly hierarchies the British perceived to exist in the savannah.233 The 
Mamprussi Na played into the British need to foster security and stability through chiefs 
in order to increase his political influence. Reports to the Colonial Office in 1911 stating 
that the Mamprussi Chief recently acquired loyalty of all the “chiefs” in the North-
Eastern Province was a reassuring sign about of the potency of chiefly rule and the 
accompanying support from the British administration.234 Chief Commissioner Irvine 
stated that the Mamprussi chief had accompanied a routine British administrative visit to 
the province, a location of many decentralized communities of the protectorate. During 
the stop, the Mamprussi Na spontaneously informed the commissioner and the assembled 
locals of his longstanding authority over the region.235 The British received this claim 
uncritically, needing to see a native solution to the longstanding problem of resistance 
that the administration endured in the North-West Province. After 1911, the Mamprussi 
became another model chiefly authority to the British, who praised the Mamprussi 	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paramount and the Imam of Gambaga for supplying labor and settling “petty disputes and 
intrigues” throughout the Gambaga District.236 The positive image of Mamprussi persisted 
through the decade, when the District Commissioner of Gambaga reflected on the 
“willing, loyal, and obedient” character of the Mamprussi.237 
The ongoing resistance to colonial rule from non-chiefly districts fortified the 
view that decentralized communities were inferior compared to chiefly areas that 
routinely cooperated with British authorities. For example, resistance to British rule in the 
Sapari (Tong) Hills continued to plague the administration past 1909. Chief 
Commissioner Irvine explained away local opposition to European intervention as simple 
“ignorance, engendered by fear as to our intention towards them.”238 Viewing defiance to 
British rule as proof that the non-chiefly districts were less evolved, commissioners 
typically responded by increasing their visits to specific villages they suspected of 
supporting dissenters. Commissioners could then explain in person the need for locals to 
accept British-appointed chiefs as their new rulers. Watherston reported, for instance, that 
cooperation in Lobi-Dagarti District temporarily improved as a result of chiefs agreeing 
to “re-organize themselves under their old paramount chiefs, instead of living as they 
were in independence and at constant warfare with one another.”239 Thus, it was clear that 
the administration categorized Africans living in non-chiefly communities as 
uncontrollable, violent people when the British were not able to remain in the area. 
The British relied on the physical presence of their administrative staff to sustain 
law and order in non-chiefly districts. The close positioning of British staff countered the 
requirements of indirect rule to rely on native chiefs to produce peace. Furthermore, it 	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was the use of military force against non-chiefly zones that illustrated how quickly the 
Enlightenment ideal of freedom for the individual disappeared in the protectorate. 
Africans from chiefly and non-chiefly communities alike suffered from the 
“depersonalization” of British officers who needed to create spheres of homogeneity 
under the guise of a new civil administration in the protectorate.240 
Commissioners believed that the need for their ongoing efforts to produce lasting 
security in the Sapari (Tong) Hills of the Zouaragu District reflected the well-entrenched 
primitive and lawless nature of non-chiefly societies. The commissioners continually 
described these non-chiefly locations as wild territories of persistent lawlessness. 
Stationing British outposts in non-chiefly districts created periods of peace and order by 
assuring villages that they were under the power of a distant chief—and the not too 
distant Enfield repeating rifle and Maxim machine-gun. Capitalizing on these initial 
achievements, Watherston reported that by the end of 1906, his staff established similar 
stations in Wa and Bole, areas in the Northwest Province where he saw potential for 
increased trade if security prevailed.241 In support of Watherston, Acting Governor of the 
Gold Coast John Rodger reported to London his optimism that ongoing British action 
against the looting and generally uncooperative Lobi-Dagarti and Nabrigo Districts 
would create peace and order.242 
Commissioner Irvine also reiterated the position that “less civilized” regions of 
the protectorate were ungovernable in the British mind due “probably to [a] lack of power 
and confidence” in their political self-determination.243 The administration decided, 
therefore, that their immediate and enduring intervention was essential in guiding the 	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natives towards realizing their potential. Watherston, in particular, remained positive 
from 1906 to his death, by fever in 1908, that the strategy of bolstering administrative 
outposts would quell the frustratingly persistent violence against trade caravans in the 
non-chiefly districts.244 
The deepening confidence with and success of the few chiefly areas in the 
protectorate reinforced the negative view the British administration had for the more 
numerous non-chiefly communities. While colonial authorities characterized tindanas as 
unevolved political figureheads, ongoing disturbances to the peace from non-chiefly 
districts only enlarged the British motivation to suppress the obsolete priest-hood from 
functioning in the protectorate. 
The British saw halting the pagan rituals of the tindana as the counterpoint to 
entrenching the secular authority of chiefs throughout the protectorate. To help support 
chiefly authority over tindanas and multiply colonial power against pockets of resistance 
in non-chiefly areas, the British established a new civic administrative system to govern 
the Northern Territories. As the previous chapter illustrates, in areas that opposed their 
system of law, British officers dispatched the infantry to enforce the peace. But 
maintaining their presence in all sectors required an established bureaucracy with the 
ability to deploy short-term military interventions against raids on caravans or other civil 
disturbances. 
Therefore, in 1906, Chief Commissioner Watherston established a civil 
bureaucracy separate from the ongoing demands of training and recruitment for the 
Second Battalion Gold Coast Regiment, the main British contingent operating in the 
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savannah.245 In exchange for a professional military attachment, Watherston instituted the 
Northern Territories Constabulary Force, headquartered at Kumasi, but with stations at 
Gambaga, Wa, Navarro, Bole, Lorha, Tumu, Tamale, Salaga, and Yeji.246 The new 
administration divided the Northern Territories into provinces and districts that relied 
upon traditional chiefly authority located in the above mentioned townships.247 In this 
way, the primarily Muslim and economic centers of Tamale, Wa, and Tumu became 
respective British administrative capitals for the Southern, North-West, and North-East 
Provinces.248 
British commissioners often resorted to military power when appointing chiefly 
rulers in non-chiefly areas. In 1911, Irvine finally ended the ten-year opposition in the 
Sapari (Tong) Hills.249 In this longstanding pocket of resistance, he previously admitted 
that the “moral effect” of temporarily stationing a company of infantry from the Gold 
Coast Regiment had failed to stop caravan raiding. As a result, Irvine ordered a direct 
military operation against the remote hills that successfully suppressed any opposition to 
British authority. After the invasion, Irvine appointed paramount chiefs and sub-chiefs 
from among the “influential natives…of the various sections of these tribes, where none 
had existed.”250 The British also created chiefly rulers for the neighboring Grunshi and 
Kanjarga. Notwithstanding these appointments, which often amplified the merely titular 
position of the chiefs, Irvine reported that passive resistance or non-compliance to British 
authority persisted. 
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Further contrasting the confidence British staff had in chiefly sectors, Armitage 
shared his frustration with the backward northern provinces of the protectorate. For the 
most part, he relayed the continued acceptance of locals to the over-lordship of the Chief 
of Mamprussi that Irvine reported in 1911. Yet, in some districts of the protectorate, 
individuals resisted British policy by following the chiefs they respected. In the districts 
of Grunshi and Kanjarga, for instance, the British-appointed chiefs rejected the 
Mamprussi paramount chief, and instead recognized the chief of Sandema and Navarro as 
their paramount. In his report to the Colonial Office, Armitage attributed their non-
compliance as a reflection of their essential “avaricious” nature.251 Thus, without 
revealing any attempt to understand the real motivations Grunshi and Kanjarga had for 
rejecting the Mamprussi, Armitage explained that he based the decision on a typically 
British stereotype that non-chiefly societies were disobedient to European orders. 
In 1915, Armitage reported his disappointment that unlike the compliant chiefly 
districts of the Southern Province, such as in Gambaga, Salaga, and Bole, the Zouaragu 
District Commissioner reported no public works active in his sector.252 In doing so, 
Armitage expressed the importance the British held in requiring strong chiefly rulers to 
maintain peaceful and productive districts. He also cited the successes the British 
experienced after his predecessor, Commissioner Irvine, managed to quell the native 
disobedience in 1911 and install chiefly leadership in the district. In particular, Armitage 
happily indicated that imports and exports in the Sapari (Tong) Hills of the North-
Western Province had increased.253 Again, the British enjoyed these gains only when they 
could maintain their staff in the area. Armitage reported that the beginning of the British 	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war effort in Europe depleted the administrative staff from the protectorate.254 As a result, 
he explained that districts where British operatives were absent reverted back to their 
“previous lawlessness” and that many individuals rejected the British created chiefs.255 
The view that tindanas were primitive spiritual figureheads underpinned the 
British action against earth-worship in non-chiefly districts of the northern provinces of 
the protectorate. For example, when continued financial restraints on the British 
government during the First World War forced the British resident to leave Zouaragu 
District, Armitage pointed out that the tindana living in the Sapari (Tong) Hills reinstated 
the earth-shrine observance, or fetish. Previously, in 1911, a major objective of the 
operation in the Tong Hills centered on forbidding ritual Earth worship. Typical of 
British sentiment that fetishism prevented the advancement of native society, Armitage 
ordered the military to again take action into the Sapari Hills. Accompanied by the 
Provincial and District commissioners, Armitage and a contingent of the Gold Coast 
Regiment marched into Zouaragu and destroyed the shrine and further convinced the 
tindana that the British intended to remain in the area.256 
 
 
Young and Old 
The northern administration interpreted the divergent reactions they saw between 
young and old Africans as evidence that colonial rule was civilizing non-chiefly society. 
The observation revealed an interesting contradiction because indirect rule intended to 
enshrine the older, traditional parts of native society. Following this rationale, the 	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administration should have expected the most cooperation with village elders, members 
of the community most in touch with local custom. As becomes clear below, the 
protectorate administration fought most with elders and least with village youth. 
The annual reports indicated how the administration described the older 
generation as ongoing resistors that symbolized the essential infantilism of non-chiefly 
tribal society. Despite the generally self-congratulatory tone that emerged in 1920, the 
British highlighted the problems associated with the generational divide between 
progressive young Africans and the remnants of their disenchanted conservative elders. 
Armitage was typically colorful in his reports. In 1916, he wrote that 
the old men and heads of compounds still resent the restored authority 
of the Chiefs and are reactionary to a man…The authority of the 
Chiefs is openly flouted and the most trivial incident may arouse all 
the savagery lying dormant in the hitherto tractable aboriginal.257 
 
A few years later Armitage continued to describe the problem of the rebelliousness and 
“fanatical hatred” among the old men of the northern provinces. “They do everything in 
their power to counteract the growing authority of the chiefs,” he fumed, “and put every 
obstacle in the way of their young men getting into touch with civilization.”258 Again, in 
1919: “They live in the past, oblivious of the miseries that they endured in their youth 
and before the advent of Whiteman.”259 In the end, the administration interpreted local 
opposition as signs of the fundamental inferiority of a generation of Africans living 
without British and chiefly patronage. 
Further disturbance in Zouaragu, according to Armitage, was the result of “old 
men” who disputed the authenticity of the local chiefs imposed by the British in recent 
years. According to Armitage, the elders had judged the cooperation of the younger 	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generation with the foreign imposed figurehead as a weakness of manhood. When the 
British left the District in 1915, the youth at the town of Lungu took up arms against 
neighboring Bongo to prove their vigor to the older generation. The violence escalated to 
the extent that the District Commissioner required reinforcements from the police force at 
Tamale. After two days of fighting, the British tried and executed six of the young 
leaders and imprisoned two others who later died in prison.260 
The notion that the youth of the protectorate represented the superiority of chiefly 
communities was a key theme to the British leading into the years of the First World 
War. Local involvement during the war was so definitive to the administration that 
Cardinal exclaimed happily, “they have broken away from their traditions, their future 
looms bright, and in no long time they will neglect and forget [the] hampering fetters of 
age-old customs…”261 Here, the traditional past of non-chiefly society appeared to 
Cardinal as an un-evolved darkness. He further reflected on what appeared as the positive 
impact that British policy had on the protectorate by arguing that supporting chieftaincy 
throughout the Northern Territories had illuminated the “darker side” of native society. 
As a sign of this dubious claim, Cardinal wondered, if the youth who lived in non-chiefly 
groups took the introduction of chieftaincy into their communities as a point of pride. To 
mark their gratitude, the younger generation proved their new superior status to their 
British commissioners by fighting in the colonial infantry against the German controlled 
forces in neighboring Togoland, Cameroon, and East Africa.262 
Cardinal held the ability of military service to imbue superior moral attributes into 
eligible young African men from the non-chiefly sectors of the protectorate in high 	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esteem. To his mind, mobilization of the Gold Coast Regiment during the First World War 
provided young Africans the “first opportunity” to express loyalty.263 In addition to this 
unlikely boast, enlisting into the Gold Coast Regiment trained young Africans in British 
forms of personal discipline, military drill, and the general requirement to wear European 
clothing and maintain European standards of personal hygiene. So great was the response 
from the youth that Armitage indicated the majority of the new soldiers stationed in 
Ashanti Region regiments were actually migrants from the Northern Territories.264 On the 
other hand, Armitage stated that the older generation had a different reaction to the British 
recruitment of soldiers from the Northern provinces. As the war drew to a close, he 
indicated that old men hurled “curses” and other threats against the “droves” of young 
recruits from the North-West Province who enlisted into the Gold Coast Regiment.265 
The Civilizing South 
By the late 1920s, the perceived superiority of the Ashanti helped initiate a new 
direction in civilizing policy among British administrators. The British represented the 
growing southward migration of youth from the savannah as another opportunity to 
civilize individuals from non-chiefly communities of the Northern Territories. By 1922, 
the Annual Reports from the north reflected the British concern about the lack of 
economic growth in the region. Since the administration measured civilization especially 
by the appearance of profitable markets and its related infrastructure, slow economic 
growth had a negative effect on the colonial imagination of the Northern Territories; 
consequently, the British positioned the Northern Territories below the relative human 
development they saw in Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony. 	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As in previous reports from the north, Chief Commissioner Louis Castellain 
thought that separating young men from their villages and exposing them to southern 
industries was essential to push aside the backwardness of their parents. He affirmed that 
by earning wages in southern mining and railway factories, youth from the protectorate 
would lose all contact with “the family fetish” and the daily routines of “their less 
civilized brothers.”266 The civilizing effect became more complete when the young 
laborers returned to the north with large amounts of disposable income to spend in 
European styled markets.267 
The annual reports confirmed that the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti Region were 
more profitable British possessions than the Northern Territories. As early as 1908, 
Northern Territories Chief Commissioner Irvine noted increased import duties received at 
trading centers in the Gold Coast compared to goods from the north.268 As the years 
progressed, southern industries increasingly drew youth from savannah neighborhoods. 
Chief Commissioner Robertson also indicated that a growing number of laborers from the 
north migrated to the colony in 1912.269 On the surface, the need to develop motorways 
and transport along the Volta River increasingly reflected the British intention to connect 
northern labor and raw materials with southern industries. Commissioner Philbrick 
reported to the Colonial Office that the Gold Coast Governor had visited Tamale in 1920 
to speak publicly to representatives of Gonja and Dagomba. The Governor’s speech 
emphasized the administration’s ongoing aim to develop commercial agriculture in the 
savannah and its associated infrastructure connecting north to south.270 Along these 
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motorways and ports of the Volta River, the British could funnel labor southward and 
earn large tax revenue in southern destinations. 
As a response, the Colonial Office focused the main wealth of the savannah—its 
cattle, agricultural goods, and workers—to underwrite industries in the Ashanti Region 
and Gold Coast. Chief Commissioner Philbrick reported to London that the Northern 
Territories still did not produce a profit or even cover its own administrative costs, 
especially since the abolition of the successful Caravan Tax in 1906.271 The Northern 
Commissioner’s office collected a paltry £1,388 through court fees, fines, licenses, and 
other fees to pay for the £13,800 in expenditures.272 Despite this shortfall, he echoed the 
view of some previous administrations that the main purpose of the protectorate was to 
supply labour south to mining, agricultural, and infrastructure ventures and candidates to 
local police services and the West African Frontier Force.273 Thus, after the initial stages 
of establishing and deepening British control over the savannah, it became increasingly 
clear that the northern staff began funneling the human resources of the north to the 
institutions and productions of southern regions. Underneath the surface of this trend lay 
the idea that the British could use the south to civilize the savannah. 
Working towards systems of indirect rule soon produced difficulties in the 
Northern Territories, a protectorate inhabited mainly by hundreds of scattered, 
decentralized family compounds with only a few centralized communities. Despite the 
limited number of chiefs, the British responded to their problems by deepening their 
commitment to chieftaincy and their array of chiefly appointments in the non-chiefly 
communities. The British were content to see chieftaincy as a legacy of Islam, and so the 	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administration continued viewing the most powerful chieftaincy in the area, the Ashanti, 
as the leading civilizing location. 
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Chapter 4 - Anthropology 
The collected writings of Gold Coast Anthropologist Ronald Sutherland Rattray 
provided academic credence to the ever-deepening belief in the superiority of chieftaincy 
in the British colonial imagination.274 The British administration commissioned Rattray’s 
studies as part of a project to create an anthropological map of the region to assist in the 
civilizing project. 
The anthropology departments of British universities were influential research 
bodies aiding the work of colonizing elites.275 The idealized image of the African chief 
illustrated how British scholars and administrators created mental images of the colonial 
subject. The “imagined community,” Uma Kothari contended, powerfully influenced the 
decisions of the colonizers in how to design their regimes.276 Rattray helped fortify the 
enduring confidence colonial administrators had in chiefly rulers in the Northern 
Territories by constructing an ideal anthropological image of chieftaincy in Ashanti. 
By using previous years’ data from the protectorate census office, Rattray 
confirmed Anderson’s claim that British colonizers employed an “imagined map [to] 
organize the new educational, juridical, public-health, police, and immigration 
bureaucracies it was building on the basis of ethno-racial hierarchies.”277 In particular, the 
Colonial Office hoped to develop “chiefs” in West Africa to become the eventual “local 
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self-government” of future statehood.278 Thus, when Rattray arrived at Tamale in the late 
1920s to research Tribes of the Northern Territories, his extensive work on Ashanti 
prepared him, and the northern administration, to recognize chiefly groups occupying the 
forefront of human progress. 
Rattray suggested that chieftaincies in the northern territories were both linked to 
the legacy of Ashanti power and a result of the civilizing influence of Islam. In elaborating 
on the latter point, Rattray reiterated what was perhaps the most influential statement 
concerning the goals of British rule in West Africa, Lord Lugard’s 1922, The Dual 
Mandate in Tropical Africa. In this work, Frederick Lugard, the governor-general of 
Nigeria, argued that centralized authority, urbanization, textile-production, literacy, and 
systems of taxation indicated a Muslim civilizing process in West Africa. Together, these 
arguments strengthened hostile British attitudes toward both the tindana and non-chiefly 
groups. 
The Problem of Chiefs in Chiefless Society 
Anthropology became a key tool for British colonizers to determine why indirect 
rule was causing severe problems in the protectorate. The British came to understand that 
the fabrication of chiefly rulers in non-chiefly areas increased regional conflicts for the 
administration of the protectorate. In this way, the near three decades of colonial rule 
through chiefs had created more disorder than its ultimate aim to foster civilized behavior. 
To the British, the key problem of Native Authorities, the array of government backed 
chiefly councils, in part lay with the poor quality of the existing chiefs. In a 1929 
conference, the Chief and District Commissioners of the protectorate described their rule 	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as “quasi indirect.” The administrative staff complained that too much in the protectorate 
still depended on their own actions and decisions, especially in legal disputes. They 
expressed hesitancy in expanding policies of indirect rule in the north due to “unreliable” 
and poorly educated chiefs, overall financial poverty, and a general lack of sustained 
initiative from Africans and British leaders alike to advance adequate taxation and 
infrastructure.279 In turn, the administration realized that the general lack and low quality 
of local chiefs hindered the economic independence of the north. 
In Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, Rattray included the following excerpt from 
an unnamed administrative source that showed how indirect rule created internal discord 
in communities without traditions of centralized authority: 
The people look with suspicion on any one who prospers and 
becomes the owner of property, or on any of their so-called ‘Chiefs,’ 
who, backed up by us, “put on airs,” and try to assume control over 
the people. The Chiefs have no prestige, no historical names to quote 
as their predecessors. This is as true to-day as it was twenty years 
ago.280 
 
As this statement indicates, Rattray conveyed that British support of chiefly authority 
assigned unnatural wealth and prestige to persons without political status.281 Writing in 
1933, District Commissioner James Eyre-Smith also confirmed that the “European-made 
chiefs” often exploit their new position to extort wealth from their new underlings.282 The 
quote also reveals the twenty years of frustration among administrators who long realized 
that the principles of indirect rule in decentralized communities had little “historical 
names” granting legitimacy to their British appointments. 	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In 1932, British Anthropologist Meyer Fortes further noted how the questionable 
power of Mamprussi over the Tallensi problematized British rule in non-chiefly 
communities. Fortes also described how by 1934 Indirect Rule accumulated individual 
wealth for chiefs and headmen and caused conflicts and extortions in Tallensi.283 Fortes 
was not an officer in the Colonial Service, but he was sympathetic to the prospect of 
British rule creating law and order and preserving native institutions in West Africa.284 He 
published a highly specialized article on the Tallensi that corresponded with Rattray’s 
research in the Northern Territories. It was no coincidence that Fortes chose the Tallensi, 
and not another decentralized society, or even a chiefly group important to the British 
Native Administration, such as the Dagomba or Gonja. Since 1901, the northern 
administration fought the Tallensi, a people of continual resistance. Like Rattray’s 
general survey of the natives of the savannah, the British hoped Fortes’ case study would 
provide scholarly insights for the administration’s attempt to pacify the Tallensi and other 
districts like the supposedely mischievous savages from the Tong Hills. Fortes 
underscored the British assumption that the Tallensi chiefs (Namoos) were subservient to 
Kurugu Division of Mamprussi.285 
The view confirmed the ongoing British belief that the Mamprussi were historical 
masters over many non-chiefly communities of the North West Province. Yet, as Fortes 
reported, British attempts to consolidate the authority of the Mamprussi chiefs over the 
Tallensi had been largely ineffective.286 Rattray also outlined how moves by ambitious 
clansmen hoping to increase their material standing hurt British rule. The chief of 
Namnam complained how, people who knew “nothing about Chieftainship,” and false-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Fortes, “The Political System of the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast”, 251. 
284 Fortes, 240, 257. 
285 Fortes, 256. 
286 Ibid., 257. 
	  	   89	  	  
chiefs gained material support from British. For example, hopeful individuals in Namnam 
aspired to the office of Kambonaba, or chief of the rifle company, simply to gain prestige 
from the British officers.287 
Inventing the “particular genius” of Chieftaincy in West Africa 
Despite these criticisms, the British never gave up their attachment to the idea of 
installing chiefs and Rattray did much to guide this endeavor. Examining his 
investigations into Ashanti and its northern tribes revealed a lengthy textual contribution 
to the British imagination of the superiority of chiefly rule in the Northern Territories. 
In 1921, Chief Commissioner of the Ashanti Region, C.H. Harper, enthusiastically 
anticipated Rattray’s forthcoming research on Ashanti “Laws and Customs.” In his yearly 
report to the Colonial Office, Commissioner Harper contemplated the relationship between 
the emergent field of anthropology and more than twenty years of “overwhelming” British 
intervention in Ashanti. He believed anthropologists must recognize some aspects of 
“native religion and culture” as worthy ingredients to the British modernizing project in 
West Africa: 
Face to face with a material progress and civilization which seems 
overwhelming and all devouring there must be a strong temptation for the 
young Ashanti to cut himself adrift from his past and to become dependent 
for all moral as well as all material needs upon the European. But 
Anthropological research will show that there is much in native religion and 
custom which is worth a secure place in modern progress and which will 
tend to preserve the genius of the people.288 
 
On one hand, the British believed they were agents of change, but needed to determine 
what features of native life could contribute to the new age they were building. As this 
thesis argues, until the late 1920s, the British largely relied upon the writing of travel 
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adventurers, political agents, and the informal ethnographies of their administrative staff 
to learn how to govern the native in West Africa. With the growing interest in racial 
understandings of humans, the Colonial Office turned to anthropology as a new source of 
formal knowledge. 
Rattray’s work on the Gold Coast represented a major intellectual contribution 
helping the British envision and construct modernity in West Africa. This undertaking, 
added Rattray, was to help the brightest Africans take 
their place in the commonwealth of nations, not as denationalized Ashanti, 
but as African People who will become the greater force and power in the 
Empire because they have not bartered the wealth of their past, 
metaphorically and not infrequently in reality, for a coat, a collar, or a 
tie.289 
 
Rattray added to the superior image of chieftaincy by discussing Ashanti chiefly 
organization as a national framework. Rattray argued that British policy should preserve 
Ashanti chieftaincies as a foundation to build European national systems in West 
Africa.290 During his years studying Kumasi and its environs, Rattray believed that the 
elite classes of Ashanti would “leave landmarks which the particular genius of that 
people will always recognize, and it will help them along the road of progress however 
difficult it may be.”291 In this way, the chiefly court of the Asante nation epitomized for 
Rattray the heights of achievement in black West Africa. He conceded, however, the 
lasting contradiction in using tradition as a vehicle to create modernity, the very anti-
thesis to tradition and other obstacles to progress: 
we would  therefore appear to be encouraging on one hand an 
institution which draws its inspiration and validity from the 
indigenous religious beliefs, while on the other we are 	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systematically destroying the very foundation upon which the 
structure that we are striving to perpetuate stands.292 
 
The more the administration took seriously the native institutions of the protectorate, as 
they increasingly did during the 1920s, the more the British faced the extent to which 
they intended chieftaincies to control the levers of future political power.293 
In part, then, Rattray reaffirmed the perceived superiority of chiefly groups in the 
Northern Territories after associating savannah chieftaincies with the Ashanti chieftaincy. 
He noted a number of apparent similarities between the Akan-speaking ruling class of the 
Asante Confederacy and the chiefly families belonging to the Mamprussi, Dagomba, 
Gonja, Nanumba, Moshi, and Wa.294 Rattray based this hypothesis in part on his analysis 
of the 1921 census, which revealed that the languages of eighty percent of the northern 
population derived from one common linguistic base.295 Rattray is responsible for 
dividing the language of the Northern Territories into its current three semi-distinct 
groups, and from these categories he found numerous linguistic similarities to Akan 
words.296 
The apparent likeness between Ashanti and the political organization and 
language of Gonja helped Rattray construct an image of the historical importance of 
northern chieftaincies. To Rattray, the people of Gonja had many idiomatic affinities with 
the Ashanti, including the use of words for “earth,” “sun,” “sky-god,” “oath,” “spirit of 
the dead,” and “landowner.”297 He also reported that the royal court of Gonja situated 
around the townships of Yendi and Naleregu mirrored the Asante alliance of chieftaincies 	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existing in and around Kumasi.298 While he admitted his want of a deeper analysis of 
Gonja compared to the attention he gave towards the Dagomba and Mamprussi 
Constitutions, later anthropological studies by Madeline Manoukian in 1951 carried on 
Rattray’s initial theorizing about the similarities in the political structure of Gonja and the 
Asante Confederation.299 The Gonja “state,” claimed Manoukian, resembled the Asante 
system of federalization by consisting of seven sub-divisions under a Paramount Chief 
(Ya-bumwura) located at a capital region (Damongo). In another instance duplicating the 
Asante political constitution, Manoukian described head-chiefs throughout Gonja 
districts serving constituents with aid from a council of Elders—which included Muslim 
clerics—and various sub-heads who directed groups of villages in the area of his 
ancestry.300 Thus, the notion of northern chieftaincies somehow connected to Ashanti 
continued to captivate scholars into a second generation of anthropology centered on the 
Northern Territories. 
The comparisons between the successful alliance systems in the north and the 
Asante Confederacy underscored the British confidence that chiefly groups in the 
Northern Territories were progressive communities. For instance, Rattray argued that 
decentralized, federal systems of politics were important explanations for the enduring 
political successes of the Mamprussi, Dagomba, Moshi, and Ashanti.301 In contrast, 
attempts at autocratic expansion failed to sustain unity.302 In this way, Rattray emphasized 
that invading groups did not have a lasting impact on empire building compared to the 
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Asante or other examples of federalized forms of politics along the Volta basin.303 In turn, 
understanding the success of collaborative approaches to political rule in the savannah 
encouraged the British belief that policies of indirect rule could secure many tribes under 
one native administration. 
Rattray also discussed comparisons between the Dagomba, Mamprussi, and 
Ashanti constitutions to confirm the superiority of chieftaincies to the administration in 
the Northern Territories. Rattray saw the following hierarchies connecting the Mamprussi 
Paramount Chief and his three divisional armies mirroring the Asante national military 
configuration. Through the divisions, a number of townships were subservient to the 
Mamprussi Paramount Chief, who had ultimate control over the three divisional armies 
protecting their local townships.304 Furthermore, the three divisional chiefs paid the 
Mamprussi Na tribute. Rattray also saw similarities between the Dagomba Constitution 
and the Asante Confederacy. He indicated that each division commanded a Left, Right, 
and Center Wing of the federal army. The Paramount Chief of Dagomba in Yendi 
occupied the Rear Guard and received protection of the Zonbareba, an elite royal guard, 
and from an accompanying rifle division, the Kyido.305 Here, another etymological 
similarity became more evident to Rattray, where he stressed how Sapa-sene in 
Mamprussi/Dagomba approximated the Akan word for Division-Head, Safo-hene.306 
Imagining a Muslim Past 
Rattray wrote about the Islamic roots to chieftaincy in the Northern Territories to 
reflect the pervasive Lugardian belief that settler Islamic society elevated the human 
status of some otherwise backwards West African communities. The pervasive use of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Rattray, Tribes, 549. 
304 Ibid., Tribes, 555. 
305 Ibid., Tribes, 569. 
306 Ibid., Tribes, 555-56. 
	  	   94	  	  
Islamic religion into the 1930s deepened Said’s contention about how British colonialism 
conceived Islam as “essentially a political instrument, not by any means a spiritual 
one.”307 
Lugard did as much to create the perceived superiority of Muslim society for 
other British administrators in West Africa. Lugard represented the Muslim foreigners as 
producers of complex and advanced cultural institutions. Similarly, he commended the 
appearance of taxation regimes, courts of justice, textile production, urbanization, and the 
advancement of agriculture as an Islamic civilizing force: “the alien immigrants in the 
northern tropical belt afford better material for social organization, both racially and 
through the influence of their creed.”308 Moreover, Lugard deemed the influx of Islamic 
society in West Africa as a step towards human progress suiting the polygamy and 
slavery practices of African communities.309 
British colonizers working in the West African savannah commonly recognized 
Islam as a more effective civilizing agent than Christianity. The reigning belief was that 
systematic Christian theology was above the simple mind of the African.  Whereas, 
British officials believed that, Islam only required adherents to embrace monotheism and 
Mohammed as a messenger of God.310 Islam, as it appeared to Lugard, was an ideal 
religious practice that could reduce black superstitions, increase personal self-control, and 
help centralize political rule around chieftaincy.311 The image of a dominating, superior 
Arab society arriving in the savannah with civilization in hand was a powerful 
encouragement about the essential connection between chieftaincies and Lugard’s 	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espoused Emirates in Northern Nigeria. As a result, the view emboldened the 
administration’s optimism that chiefly groups were superior human communities. 
The British recognized similar ancestries between Nigerian emirates and 
chieftaincies in the Northern Territories indicating common human progress in West 
Africa. For instance, Lugard saw the introduction of “Aryan or Hamitic blood” elevating 
the primitive tribal culture of black West Africa.312 He argued that the Muslim forefathers 
of Hausaland, Bornu, and Yoruba in Northern Nigeria shared European cultural 
achievement of the thirteenth century.313 
Highlighting the Islamic origins to chiefly rule was a significant way that Rattray 
signaled to the administration that indirect rule was as suitable for Chiefs in the Northern 
Territories as it was with Emirs in Nigeria. In reading The Dual Mandate as an unofficial 
textbook for colonial rule in West Africa, the administration in the Northern Territories 
had many reasons to recognize chieftaincy as a cultural artifact produced by a superior 
immigrant group to West Africa. Relying on this interpretation, the officers were inclined 
to recognize the superiority of distant ethnicities represented among the natives. “Chief 
among them,” commented District Commissioner James Eyre-Smith, “being Berber, 
Semitic, Arab, Egyptian, so that we are not dealing with a homogenous race of negros in 
any part of the Gold Coast.”314 Eyre-Smith postulated that these outsiders were “from a 
more highly developed state, and bringing with them superior knowledge, were able to 
become the ruling classes among the conquered peoples.”315 His comments mirrored the 
persistent view of the administration in around 1933 that the settlement of Arab or 
Muslim travelers elevated black West Africa. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Lugard, 76; Curtin, 4, 11. 
313 Lugard, 76. 
314 Eyre-Smith. 14. 
315 Ibid., 29. 
	  	   96	  	  
In the Northern Territories, Rattray postulated that the Mamprussi chieftaincy 
originated from the Sokoto Caliphate, a pre-colonial Muslim state with links to Hausa. 
From his informants, Rattray described four descendants from the first Mamprussi 
Paramount Chief, Bawa, who migrated west from his Sokoto homeland. Eventually, 
successors to the Mamprussi royal line moved to various townships located in the 
Northern Territories.316 From these new locations, the Muslim chiefs intermarried with 
the local inhabitants and established the Wala, Dagomba, Moshi, Nanumba, and Gonja 
states. Recognizing this progressive racial tie to Northern Nigeria, the British eventually 
built these groups into major Native Administrations.317 Rattray’s description of the 
ascendant Muslim ancestry to the chiefly groups in the Northern Territories reflected the 
longstanding British optimism with the Mamprussi, Dagomba, and Gonja as historically 
strong Muslim “successors” capable of supporting the northern colonial bureaucracy.318 
The absence of existing emirates in the Northern Territories did not diminish the 
superior image of chieftaincy in Rattray’s writing. After all, Rattray held to Lugard’s 
main presupposition that chiefly authority, not necessarily Islamic faith and practice, 
indicated human progress.319 Rattray saw Muslim newcomers bringing a new “barbaric 
state” to the savannah and allowed the tenants of Islam to integrate with the local 
spiritualist practices.320 Notice from his comment that the Africans with Islamic history 
remained “barbaric,” signaling the lowly condition of all Africans in the British mind. 
The foreigners, he elaborated, for the most part adopted the language and ethnic identities 
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of the communities they encountered instead of expanding monotheist religion.321 The 
quasi-Islamic faith of northern chiefs was the outcome of the spiritual beliefs of migrants 
east of the Volta River, in Nigeria. According to Rattray, the Hausa “aliens, i.e. settlers 
from Northern Nigeria,” were a minority society compared to the “pagans” that occupied 
the backward provinces of the protectorate.322 The annual reports during the 1920s also 
reiterated this perception of religious practice in the north. British surveys of the 
protectorate echoed the limited, yet still evident, extent “Mohamedans” had in established 
themselves among “Pagan” and “Christian” followers in the Northern Territories.323 
According to his 1922-23 Annual Report, Chief Commissioner Castellain indicated that a 
diluted form of Islam in the Northern Territories remained in the few market districts of 
with Hausa ancestry, such as in Wa and Salaga.324 By 1926, Leigh recounted the 
“sprinkling of Mohammedans,” but pointed out the Muslim presence in Wa and Salaga 
had “been for generations living in those towns.”325 
Rattray fueled the British enthusiasm to see non-chiefly areas of the protectorate 
as weak subjects to chiefly groups of Muslim heritage. In doing so, Rattray confirmed the 
underlying belief held by twentieth century British imperialists like Lugard about the 
function Islam played in promoting human progress in West Africa: “Tribalism had over 
the centuries been sublimated by Islam.”326 Rattray explained that the ancestral 
Mamprussi were Islamic “wandering soldiers of fortune” that introduced secular political 
authority opposing the older spiritualist-cults of the tindana.327 
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Rattray listened to common narratives from elders, headmen, and chiefs about the 
ebbing place of tindanas in the local memory of the Northern Territories following the 
Muslim immigration. According to the numerous accounts of elders and chiefs at the 
Mamprussi capital region of Naleregu, Rattray indicated that the Muslim forbearers of 
Mamprussi settled in their present locations and collaborated with resident tindanas for 
clan authority over land, material possessions, and people.328 While he pointed out an 
exceptional case where the invading Mamprussi chief, Na Nyagesa, executed scores of 
tindana before settling in Eastern Dagomba, the occupying chiefs largely came to rule in 
a peaceful conjunction with the resident spiritual leaders “in a kind of dual mandate.”329 
Fortes also recognized the influence of Muslim chiefs in reestablishing a new system of 
secular land ownership. Notably, he relayed a Tallensi clan myth that detailed the 
overwhelming affect the “red turban, the flowing gown, the horse and the gun”330  of the 
invading Muslim chief Mosuor had on the tindanas of the Tong hills, who tendered his 
ancestor’s land in exchange for lasting peace. Similar to Fortes, Rattray continued the 
administration’s view that past Islamic agents challenged the traditional socio-political 
structure of the Northern Territories before British rule. 
The belief that non-chiefly groups were historically subservient to chiefly rulers 
of Islamic descent further reinforced the belief in the superiority of chieftaincy in the 
Northern Territories. Another interesting illustration to Rattray about the historical power 
of Muslim chiefs over non-chiefly groups in the Northern Territories lay with his 
description of the Nankanse. According to Rattray, the Nankanse preferred their older 
name of “Grunshi,” a word meaning “Unbeliever,” “Kaffir,” or “eater of dogs” that 	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illustrated Muslim ascendancy in the local history.331 Rattray’s informants illustrated how 
Muslim and British arrival to the savannah slowly corroded the importance of tindanas 
from village life. After the arrival of the British, the enduring significance of tindanas in 
matters of land ownership, imposition of fines and matters of justice, and ceremonial 
sacrifices all but completely dissappeared.332 
The endorsement from an Oxford scholar like Rattray of a supposed social 
hierarchy in the savannah held powerful implications for the Colonial Office’s intention 
for West Africa. The influence of scientific racism asserted that “regions of the earth 
designated as uncivilized … ought to be annexed or occupied by advance powers.”333 In 
creating or relating the military supremacy of chiefly groups over non-chiefly societies, 
Rattray helped the London office justify the use of force in many of the decentralized 
regions of the protectorate. The superior image of chieftaincy reinforced negative views 
among the administration for pagan non-chiefly areas. The British continually worried 
that, unless checked, the tindana would frustrate colonial control over land. Again, the 
northern administration required strong chiefs to keep the balance of power in favor of 
the British. By not strengthening chiefly rule in West Africa, Lugard argued that 
administrators would have to continually confront primitive landlords like the tindana.334 
Similarly, the administration in the Northern Territories remained diligent in monitoring 
the vitality of tindanas in outlying districts. For instance, earth-priests in the protectorate 
resurfaced in a 1924 report by Chief Commissioner Louis Castellain. The Chief 
Commissioner reported that an earth-shrine appeared in the Tong Hills near the 
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previously outlawed shrine the British military first destroyed in 1911.335 In response to 
this, and other shows of cultural degradation, the British frequently employed the 
military. 
The British continued to use their decades old “sanction of force” to create law 
and order in backwards non-chiefly areas of the Northern Territories.336 Louis Castellain 
reported that the Northern Territories Constabulary was key to ending recurring inter-
tribal conflicts among the “primitive people” of Konkomba in the Eastern Dagomba 
District at Sambul. After a few days, the police illustrated to the Konkomba the force of 
the British over the village by destroying 4000 poisoned arrows.337 Armed conflict 
between the Konkomba and the Lawalugu indicated to the British that that the civilizing 
mission to “primitive people” of the protectorate remained unfinished: “any small dispute 
such as the possession of a fish or guinea fowl, will often lead to bloodshed among these 
primitive people.”338 
The British maintained their belief in non-chiefly communities as infantile 
districts dependent on ongoing administrative presence. Developing quality infrastructure 
in the north also remained central to the commissioners’ ability to frequent the rest 
houses in each district. Chief Commissioner Leigh reiterated to London that instilling 
confidence in the local chiefs hinged on British officers remaining in each district.339 In 
1923, Louis Castellain happily reported to London that a completed motorway connected 
the “more wilder districts” of Zuaragu, Yeji, Tumu-Lawra, Bamboi, and Navrongo to 
chiefly led areas more central to the administration in Salaga, Tamale, Walewale, Wa, 
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and Bole.340 The Colonial Office might have had some reason to think the strategy of 
regular administrative visits was having a positive effect on the civility of non-chiefly 
districts. The chronic difficulty the administration experienced in Lobi District seemed to 
dissipate in the early-1920s. Castellain optimistically quoted from the yearly report 
produced by the Lawra District Commissioner that positively demonstrated the 
pacification in “Lobi” and “Lobi-Dagarti” Districts of the Northern Province. The many 
British subjects there were a “sedate crowd, 75 per cent at least being clothed, many of 
them in European clothes, all wearing some kind of headgear, who [met] the 
Commissioner a few hundred yards from the Rest House.”341 In 1924, Castellain again 
noted the apparent peace of the northern frontiers of the protectorate and that many 
individuals wore European clothing, a key sign of civilization.342 He was particularly 
astonished by such progress in non-chiefly areas that normally required at least a minimal 
British presence.343 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
“The traits ascribed to the colonized are incompatible with one another, though 
this does not bother his prosecutor.” 344  
Albert Memmi 
 
A study of the establishment of colonial rule in the Northern Territories of the 
Gold Coast Colony clearly revealed the British perception that chieftaincy indicated 
human progress. The British had more than simple economic motivations for pushing 
north into the Gold Coast hinterland during the partition of Africa. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the Colonial Office pursued a civilizing mission that relied upon an 
imagined continuum of human progress. In particular, British officials and scholars 
ranked the few ancestrally Islamic chieftaincies of the savannah above their more 
numerous non-chiefly neighbors. The relative inferiority of non-chiefly groups compared 
to the superiority of chieftaincies was a prominent discourse in the British colonial 
memory. This binary image of the savannah was part of a wider Orientalist literary 
tradition that functioned in the construction of the modern British self-image. The British 
continually needed to reinforce the negative perception of Africans to simultaneously 
create the image of the British Empire as a guardian of human civilization. Examining 
how the British used the history of Islamic West Africa to prove the inferiority of pure 
African society furthers that view. 
The British typically overdrew Islam on the socio-political cartography of the 
Western Sudan. British emissaries, like Dupuis, Bowdich, Barth, and Park, who only 
visited the periphery of the region, constructed vivid images of a Muslim Empire 
operating the levers of central power in the savannah. They assumed that the more 
familiar Emirs in northern Africa and in Nigeria had similar representatives in trade and 	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politics between Timbuktu and Kumasi. Near the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Colonial Office came to trust this myth of the interior and subsequently targeted the 
Dagomba, Gonja, and Mossi in treaty arrangements intending to persuade the Germans 
and French that England had legal relationships with the native authorities of the area. 
The British perception of Islam had a lasting influence on the colonial 
imagination of the savannah. Interestingly, while the British Empire fought the savage 
revolts of Jihadists in Tanzania and feared the warlord Samory operating out of Cote 
D’Ivoire, they paradoxically praised the civilizing nature of Islam in the hinterlands of 
the Gold Coast. In the Nigerian administration, Lugard wrote lengthy dissertations on the 
superiority of Muslim culture compared to the scattered, simple, tribal villages of West 
Africa. Senior British administrators and anthropologists working in the savannah, like 
Lugard, Northcott, Rattray, and others, recognized trade, law, literacy, improved housing, 
clothing, medical care, and horse keeping, as examples of a Muslim civilizing effect. 
Furthermore, the mere Muslim ancestry to Dagomba and other chieftaincies were enough 
to convince the Colonial Office that chieftaincies were suited to represent British 
interests. 
The British principle of indirect rule was a thin disguise to the application of 
direct force over the protectorate. While indirect rule depended on and supposedly 
preserved local traditional authorities, the British still exerted military and legal power 
when Africans did not comply with the colonial government. British administrators 
unhesitatingly fined and imprisoned all unwilling and outspoken members of the 
savannah. The arrests and detentions seemed more predictable in non-chiefly, or 
rebellious, regions but were also an intrusive activity in chiefly zones.   The close 
relationship between district commissioners and chiefs, meant to license British 
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exploitation of local custom, ensured that chiefs and other African figures had no real 
option but to assent to the wants of the administration. The British believed their presence 
in the protectorate was unavoidable and absolutely necessary because African leaders, 
after all, were incapable of civilized decision-making. In this way, the application of 
colonial power had little difference in chiefly and non-chiefly communities, despite 
contesting the supposedly evolved political structures of chieftaincies. In decentralized 
areas, the British removed the bonds of kinship and ritual among tindanas and other 
village headmen by instituting “Government-made” chiefly authorities. When direct 
resistance, however localized, prohibited the British safe entry and threatened caravan 
routes, the colonizers escalated their response through direct military action. Thus, in 
both chiefly and non-chiefly groups, the local administration dispossessed Africans by 
subjecting them to an indifferent and militarily forceful colonial regime. 
The British recognized the slave raiding of chiefly groups as a form of military 
superiority but intended law and order policies in the protectorate to end local 
kidnappings. For instance, the historical practice of slave raiding among the Dagomba 
created worry among the British administration that military leaders in Dagbon might 
continue to threaten the mandate of local security throughout the protectorate. The 
administration intended law and order ordinances to create a kind of civilized behavior 
that mirrored similar goals in British cities. Thus, caravan raids, murders, and 
kidnappings in the protectorate did not just disrupt the economy and general peace of the 
countryside, but the British also framed these behaviors as uncivilized signs of past 
inhumanities of the Muslim warlord Samory. The contradiction remained clear that while 
the British considered slavery an aberration of human nature, the slaving actions of 
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Dagomba and Samory nevertheless helped foster the superior image of chiefs and chiefly 
rule in the Northern Territories. 
 By supporting traditional authorities colonial masters ironically experienced 
resistance from an older generation of Africans living in the protectorate. Had the British 
been truly supporting traditional authority, they might have expected greater opposition 
from the young, left out of such an arrangement. Conversely, Africans more in touch with 
the traditions of the village might have appeared more compliant with the British 
outsiders. Yet, the annual reports illustrated the opposite trend. The documents often 
commented on how the young more readily accepted colonial institutions, while an older 
generation continually opposed colonial rule. The administration routinely portrayed 
insubordinate African parents and grandparents as symbols or links to the superstition 
and savagery of life before protectorate rule. 
British colonial discourse relied on Europe and Africa remaining at different 
stages of human progress and yet the intention of colonialism in the protectorate was to 
develop a modern society. In the Northern Territories, chieftaincies like Dagomba and 
Gonja were superior because of their ancestral differences to mainstream savannah 
society. The British needed this image of the fundamental superiority of chieftaincies to 
justify their plans for the material and human development of the savannah. Yet, the 
wider motivation underpinning colonialism was the continual differentiation of Europe as 
progress and Africa as stagnancy. During the civilizing mission, both views of 
Africans—the positive image of chieftaincies that supported the tactics of indirect rule 
and the negative image of all Africans that supported the strategy of colonialism—could 
not last at the other’s expense for very long. 
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Chronic resistance in non-chiefly societies prevented effective governance. 
Administrators reported compliance to their rule mainly in traditional chiefly zones, but 
the array of Government-made chiefs created discord throughout the savannah. In 
response, the colonial government increased its research into African life hoping to 
sharpen its implementation of indirect rule, understanding, as Foucault has made clear, 
that knowledge is power. The rise of a generation of false-chiefs, or what Mammdani 
titled “decentralized despotists,” was a feature of all districts and undermined the 
effectiveness of British rule in the protectorate. Beyond this, the annual reports revealed 
that the general lack of chieftaincy compared to Ashanti and the Gold Coast hurt the 
British effort to maintain total control through Native Authorities. The lack of chiefly 
leadership, especially compared to the southern regions of the protectorate, reinforced the 
British perception that the savannah was barren of progress. Coincident to this view, the 
relative minority of chiefly groups weakened the British expectation that the Northern 
Territories would become an economically profitable beacon of human progress in West 
Africa. 
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